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But ultimately there are limits to what can be achieved by a pure intervention policy. 
The monetary crises under the Bretton Woods  system showed that powerful market 
trends cannot be suppressed through exchange market interventions by central banks, 
and more recent monetary history has reaffirmed this. 
Deutsche Bundesbank (1982, 25) 
5.1  Introduction 
In a report published in July 1985,  economic policymakers from ten industrial 
countries  reviewed  the performance  of  floating  exchange rates  to date and 
concluded that “the key elements of the current international monetary system 
require no major institutional change.”  Within three months, however, finance 
ministers and central bank governors from five of the largest industrial countries 
announced  their readiness  for concerted action to reduce  the  U.S. dollar’s 
foreign-exchange value. The Group of Five’s announcement, made at the Plaza 
Hotel in New York on Sunday, September 22, initiated a series of international 
accords centered around the management of key dollar exchange rates.2 Un- 
derstandings concerning joint intervention in foreign-exchange markets have 
figured prominently in these accords, which thus represent a clear modification 
of the U.S. distaste for intervention that prevailed during the first half of the 
Reagan administration. 
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This paper focuses  on the practice  and effects of foreign-exchange inter- 
vention during the years  1985-88  by the three largest industrial economies, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and the United States. A wide variety 
of  economic policy  tools-monetary,  fiscal,  and commercial, to name just 
three-can  be used to influence exchange rates. To isolate the “pure”  effects 
of  intervention on exchange rates, the discussion below distinguishes between 
sterilized interventions, whose monetary effects are neutralized by  offsetting 
domestic  liquidity  measures,  and  nonsterilized  interventions, which  alter 
money supplies and therefore involve the joint exercise of monetary policy and 
exchange market  policy.  If  effective in  achieving  significant  and  sustained 
exchange rate  changes,  sterilized  intervention  could  give governments an 
additional  policy  tool  helpful  in  resolving  conflicts  between  the  monetary 
policies  appropriate  for internal  balance  and those  appropriate  for external 
balance. 
In  June  1982, participants at  the  Versailles  Economic Summit commis- 
sioned an official Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention to study 
the efficacy of government interventions in exchange markets. The Working 
Group’s April 1983 report concluded that sterilized intervention is a relatively 
weak  instrument  of  exchange-rate policy,  with  little  apparent  effectiveness 
beyond the very short run. This finding is in accord with the statement by the 
Bundesbank  given above, as well as with academic research on the subject, 
which reaches conclusions that are at least as negati~e.~  In the months since 
the Plaza meeting, however,  a substantial  realignment  of  industrial country 
currency values has been achieved and exchange market intervention (much 
of  it sterilized) has been conducted on a scale not seen since the early  1970s. 
A fresh look at intervention experience may yield new conclusions, conclu- 
sions  relevant  for evaluating  the  recent  experience of  international  policy 
coordination and the prospects for its future success. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the recent evolution 
of key macroeconomic  fundamentals, other than intervention, that are likely 
to have influenced exchange rates. This narrative sets out the macroeconomic 
context in which  intervention  has been conducted, and also provides  infor- 
mation needed for assessing the independent role of  intervention in currency 
market developments. 
Section 5.3 then sets out the mechanics of  both sterilized and nonsterilized 
intervention,  emphasizing the  effects  on asset  supplies  of  alternative  inter- 
vention strategies. Portfolio-balance theories of  effective sterilized interven- 
tion  are  reviewed  in  this  section,  which  also presents  some econometric 
evidence on foreign currency risk premiums. 
Section 5.4 considers  an alternative  to the portfolio-balance  rationale  for 
sterilized intervention, the “signaling”  theory. According to this view, official 
portfolio  shifts  between  nonmoney  assets  can  influence  exchange  rates, 
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credibly signaling future policy intentions or information not widely  appre- 
ciated by the market. A simple but limited model of effective signaling, driven 
by the government’s concern about capital losses on its net assets, is outlined 
and evaluated. Alternative signaling models driven by asymmetric information 
also receive brief attention. 
Section  5.5 reports approximate  data on foreign-exchange  interventions 
carried out since the first half of the 1980s, and evaluates the likelihood that 
portfolio effects associated with those interventions have had a major influence 
on exchange rates. The conclusion reached is that monetary and fiscal policies, 
and not intervention per se, have been the main policy determinants of exchange 
rates  in  recent  years.  Pure  intervention  seems to have  played  an effective 
signaling role, in the sense of  speeding desired exchange rate movements or 
impeding undesired ones, when promptly backed up by other, more substantive 
policy adjustments. But the portfolio effects of pure intervention have generally 
been elusive enough that intervention cannot be regarded as a macroeconomic 
policy tool in its own right, with an impact somehow independent of short-term 
decisions on monetary and fiscal policy. Even in 1987, when massive sterilized 
interventions were carried out by Germany and Japan, any associated portfolio 
effects failed to stop sharp appreciations of both the mark and the yen against 
the dollar.  Recent experience does not justify  the view  that sterilized inter- 
vention offers much help in resolving open-economy policy dilemmas. 
5.2  After the Strong Dollar: Macroeconomic Adjustment in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and the United States 
The dollar reached its most recent peak in the first quarter of  1985 amid a 
pattern  of  large  and  growing  external  imbalances  in  the  main  industrial 
co~ntries.~  By  1987, the current account deficit of the United States stood at 
$154 billion, or 3.4 percent of U.S.  gross national product; the current-account 
surplus of Japan was $87 billion, or 3.6 percent of GNP; and that of Germany 
was $45 billion,  or 4.0 percent of GNP.’  The size and persistence of  these 
imbalances  is  unprecedented  in  the  postwar  period;  to  reduce  them  to 
sustainable levels, without compromising the goal of noninflationary  growth, 
was the immediate objective of the international policy coordination efforts 
mounted in the second half of the  1980s. 
5.2.1  The Evolution of Cooperative Exchange Rate Management 
A substantial realignment  of  the principal currencies’ real exchange rates 
appeared to be a precondition  for a return  to a sustainable configuration of 
current accounts. Between December  1978 and February 1985, the dollar had 
appreciated (in nominal terms) by 45 percent against the German mark and by 
25  percent  against  the  Japanese  yen;  by  the  end  of  August  1985, having 
depreciated  from February  levels by  19.4 percent  against the  mark  and by 200  Maurice Obstfeld 
9.4 percent against the yen, the dollar seemed set on the necessary downward 
adjustment  path.6  (See  figs.  5.1  and  5.2,  which  show  bilateral  nominal 
exchange rates from the end of 1978 and from the start of  1985, respectively.) 
A sharp dollar upswing in the first week of September 1985, occurring against 
a backdrop of rising protectionism in the U.S. Congress, was the catalyst for 
the Group of  Five (G-5)  Plaza announcement and the approach to exchange 
rate management it initiated.’ 
Significant milestones in the ongoing evolution of this approach include the 
following: 
Plaza Agreement (September 22, 1985).  Participants agreed that ‘‘exchange 
rates should better reflect fundamental economic conditions than has been the 
case,”  that “in view of the present and prospective changes in fundamentals, 
some further orderly appreciation of the main non-dollar currencies against the 
dollar is desirable,” and that G-5 governments would “stand ready to cooperate 
more closely to encourage this when to do so would be helpful.”  Funabashi 
(1988) has given an account of the meeting based, in part, on interviews with 
unnamed  participants.  According  to  this  account,  an  understanding  was 
reached to conduct simultaneous sales of up to  $18 billion,  with the goal of 
cents/mark  cents  /yen 
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lowering the dollar’s value by 10 to 12 percent over a period of six weeks. The 
implications of this  intervention  for national  monetary  policies and  interest 
rates-and,  in particular,  the question of  sterilization-were  apparently not 
discussed.  Pledges on fiscal policy  were made, however,  including a U.S. 
pledge to pursue tax reform and government deficit reduction. 
Coordinated interest rate reductions (March-April 1986). On March 6 and 
7, the central banks  of  France, Germany, Japan, and  the  United  States all 
lowered  their  discount  rates,  hoping  to  stimulate  global  growth  without 
upsetting  the exchange rate realignment process.  On April 21 the monetary 
authorities of  Japan and the United States both  lowered their discount rates 
again. 
Tokyo Summit (May 4-5,  1986). The Group of Seven heads of state set up 
the Group of Seven Finance Ministers to review the “mutual compatibility” 
of members’ policies between the annual summit meetings. These multilateral 
surveillance exercises, to be conducted in cooperation with the International 
Monetary  Fund,  were  to  consider a  number  of  “indicators”  of  economic 
performance, including exchange rates, international reserves, current account 
and trade balances, and fiscal deficits. The summit declaration seemed to back 
off a bit from the more vigorous interventionism of the Plaza announcement: 202  Maurice Obstfeld 
it recommended that “remedial efforts focus first and foremost on underlying 
policy fundamentals,” and reaffirmed the  1983 Williamsburg  Summit com- 
mitment “to intervene in exchange markets when to do so would be helpful.” 
First meeting oj  the G-7Jinunce  ministers  (September 27.  1986). A year 
after the Plaza  Agreement, the G-7 finance ministers  agreed  that  members 
should  adopt  macroeconomic  policies  to  reduce  external  imbalances  to 
sustainable levels “without further significant exchange rate adjustment.” In 
other words, even though major effects of  the exchange rate realignment on 
current accounts remained to be seen, realignment had proceeded far enough 
over the past year to allow countries to stabilize currency values. Nonetheless, 
between October 1986 and February 1987, the dollar depreciated roughly 13.0 
percent further against the mark and 5.5 percent further against the yen. (See 
fig. 5.2.) 
Louvre Accord (February 22, 1987). The G-7 finance ministers and central 
bank governors (except Italy) made their strongest statement yet on the need 
to hold nominal exchange rates near existing levels, but did not reveal to the 
public exact reference levels or allowable ranges of variation around them: 
The Ministers  and  Governors agreed  that  the  substantial  exchange rate 
changes since the Plaza Agreement will increasingly contribute to reducing 
external imbalances  and have now brought their currencies within ranges 
broadly  consistent  with  underlying  economic  fundamentals,  given  the 
policy  commitments  summarized in  this  statement.  Further  substantial 
exchange rate  shifts  among their currencies could  damage growth  and 
adjustment prospects in their countries. In current circumstances, therefore, 
they agreed to cooperate closely to foster stability of exchange rates around 
current levels. 
The published “policy commitments” included a German promise of tax cuts, 
Japanese assurances of fiscal stimulus and tax reform, and a U.S. pledge to cut 
the federal deficit to 2.3  percent ofGNPin 1988. According to Funabashi (1988, 
186-87), the participants also agreed to spend as much as $4 billion intervening 
over the period ending in April. Their goal, he reports, was to stabilize the mark 
and  the yen  within  +-5 percent  ranges  of  1.8250 marks/dollar  and  153.50 
yenidollar, respectively.  Intervention  would  occur  “on  a  voluntary  basis” 
within a k  2.5 percent band of these central rates, was “expected to intensify” 
between the 2.5 and 5 percent limits, and would be supplemented  by mandatory 
“consultation  on policy  adjustment”  at the 5 percent limit. A 7 percent ap- 
preciation of the yen relative to its Louvre parity was, however, ratified at a 
G-7 meeting in April  1987, where it was agreed, once again, that  “around 
current levels” member currencies ‘‘are  within ranges broadly consistent with 
economic fundamentals and the basic policy intentions outlined at the Louvre 
meeting.”  A similar favorable assessment  of  the appropriateness  of  current 
exchange rate levels was offered by  the G-7 after their September 26, 1987 
meeting. This last announcement, however,  followed nearly  six months  of 
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The G-7  response to the stock market crash (December 22, 1987). After the 
stock  market  collapse  of  October  19, 1987, the dollar depreciated  sharply 
against foreign currencies. The subsequent G-7 communiquk refrained from 
any direct  pronouncement  on the  appropriateness  of current  exchange rate 
levels. A warning to the foreign-exchange  markets was, however, issued: 
The Ministers  and Governors agreed  that  either excessive  fluctuation  of 
exchange rates, a further decline of the dollar, or a rise in the dollar to an 
extent  that  becomes  destabilizing  to  the  adjustment  process  could  be 
counterproductive  by  damaging growth  prospects  in the world economy. 
They re-emphasized  their common interest in  more stable exchange rates 
among their  currencies  and  agreed to  continue to  cooperate  closely  in 
monitoring  and implementing policies to strengthen underlying  economic 
fundamentals to foster stability of exchange rates. In addition, they agreed 
to cooperate closely on exchange markets. 
(This warning was repeated, in almost identical words, after the April  1988 
G-7 meeting.) The communiquk praised the period of  exchange rate stability 
from  the  Louvre  to  the  September  G-7  meeting,  as  well  as  “the  basic 
objectives and economic policy directions agreed in the Louvre Accord. . . .” 
Policy pledges included greater fiscal stimulus in Germany, continued stimulus 
in  Japan,  and further fiscal  consolidation  in  the  United  States.’  This G-7 
declaration followed disappointing  news on the U.S. trade deficit in the first 
half  of  December; the  declaration, perhaps  because  of  its  vagueness, did 
nothing to dispel the ensuing selling pressure on the dollar, which only abated 
in early January after concerted intervention.’ 
Toronto Summit (June 19-21,  1988). After another, nearly six months of 
relative  exchange rate  stability,  the  seven  heads of  state repeated  the now 
familiar ban on further dollar depreciation or “destabilizing”  appreciation. 
Around the same time, however,  positive  news on the U.S. foreign deficit, 
rising  dollar interest rates, and  official remarks  seemingly favorable to the 
possibility of some dollar appreciation  set off a two-month slide of the mark 
and yen against the dollar. 
G-7 Berlin statement  (September 24, 1988). In the wake of the previous 
summer’s dollar appreciation, the participants endorsed exchange rate stability 
in general terms but did not repeat their earlier formula, which had labeled as 
“counterproductive”  any significant change in the dollar’s value. After the 
G-7 meeting, however,  individual  statements by  the G-5 foreign  ministers 
expressed  satisfaction  with  the  prevailing  levels  of  exchange rates.  Their 
assessment contradicted that of the IMF’s managing director, who, in widely 
publicized  remarks,  deplored  the  dollar’s  appreciation  since  the  Toronto 
Summit. 
5.2.2  Exchange Rate Fundamentals:  Monetary  Policies 
In evaluating the role played by pure intervention in recent years, it is useful 
to have some perspective on the behavior of other fundamental determinants 204  Maurice Obstfeld 
of exchange rates, and on the ability of these fundamentals to explain exchange 
market  developments. Because  of  the  close link  between  intervention  and 
monetary policy, a natural focus is an account of money-market conditions in 
Germany,  Japan, and the  United  States. In recent  years,  the  often  erratic 
behavior of  money demand and of  individual monetary aggregates has made 
it perilous to use any one as an indicator of the stance of monetary policy. Some 
inferences about monetary tightness can, however, be based on the behavior 
of short-term nominal interest rates. In sticky price exchange rate models, these 
rates  tend  to fall  (rise)  in  the  short run,  reinforcing  the  home  currency’s 
depreciation (appreciation), when monetary policy is expansionary  (contrac- 
tionary) or when the money demand function shifts downward (upward).  lo The 
peril in relying even on short-term nominal interest rates as indicators of monetary 
ease is, of course, that these rates are influenced by other factors, notably the price 
level and output. It is therefore advisable to consider additional relevant infor- 
mation, when it is available, in assessing the stance of monetary policy. 
Figure 5.3  shows short-term nominal interest rates on mark, yen, and dollar 
deposits since 1978; interest differentials (dollar less mark and dollar less yen) 
are  shown  in  figure  5.4.  The  figures  suggest  that  the  foundation  for the 
percentage 
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downward trend of the dollar after the first quarter of  1985 was a falling trend 
in dollar interest rates from a local peak reached early in the suminer of 1984. 
As dollar interest fell through the late spring of  1985, yen and mark interest 
fluctuated in narrow ranges.  Accordingly, the interest differential in favor of 
dollars dropped precipitously over the period. Apparently behind this drop was 
a sharp shift in U.S.  monetary policy: as dollar interest rates began to fall, M2 
growth, which had been in the lower portion of  its 6-9  percent  1984 target 
range, jumped sufficiently to finish the year around the top."  In addition, the 
Federal Reserve made !h  percent  cuts in its discount rate in November and 
December of 1984. In subsequent testimony before Congress, Federal Reserve 
Chairman Paul Volcker included the disruptive effects of the dollar's continu- 
ing strength among the factors that motivated this easing of monetary policy. 
The effects  of  looser  money  did  not  show up immediately  in  exchange 
markets; indeed, during the fall of  1984, the dollar appreciated against the 
mark and yen, and then jumped upward between December 1984 and February 
1985 as the  pace  of  U.S. interest rate reduction  slowed and  (in  February) 
temporarily reversed. The dollar began to decline from its peak, however, as 
a renewed  narrowing  of  the  interest differentials  favoring dollars began  in 
percentage 
points 
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March. Fueling this development was U.S. M2 growth around the top of  its 
range,  another  ‘/2  percent  discount  rate  cut  in  May,  and  progress  on  the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  deficit reduction legislation,  which President Rea- 
gan  signed at the  end of  1985. Falling  interest rates in  Germany  probably 
slowed, but did not prevent,  the dollar’s very sharp depreciation against the 
mark. 
A firming of U.S. interest rates in the summer of 1985 helped set the stage 
for the  September dollar  rally  that preceded  the  Plaza  announcement.  The 
announcement was not accompanied by an immediate change in international 
interest differentials; however, it occasioned an immediate fall in the dollar, 
even  before  any  official  intervention  occurred.  The  exchange  markets’ 
response represented,  in part, a reassessment of the likely permanence of the 
expansionary  monetary  tack  pursued  by  the  Federal  Reserve  in  previous 
months. As an official U.S. account put it: 
In part, the exchange market reaction reflected the fact that the announce- 
ment was unexpected. More importantly, market participants noted that the 
initiative had come from the United States and viewed it as a change in the 
U.S.  government’s  previously  perceived  attitude  of  accepting  or  even 
welcoming the strong dollar. In addition, the agreement was interpreted as 
eliminating the likelihood that the Federal Reserve would  tighten reserve 
conditions in response to rapid U.S. monetary growth.  l3 
Faced with selling pressure on the yen, the Bank of Japan pushed yen interest 
sharply higher in October; mark interest rates rose only slightly in that month. 
Over the course of 1986, dollar interest first rose, then declined, and then rose 
relative to yen  interest,  while falling more or less steadily relative to mark 
interest. The dollar’s depreciation against the yen from end-September  1985 
to end-December  1986, 36.4 percent, was about the same as its depreciation 
against the mark, 37.6 percent, in contrast to the dollar’s greater fall vis-A-vis 
the mark in the months before the Plaza Agreement. During this period, U.S. 
M2 growth remained strong; in addition to the coordinated discount-rate cuts 
mentioned above, which brought the U.S. rate down to 6.5 percent by the end 
of April, the Federal Reserve carried out two unilateral  1/2 percent cuts in July 
and August. 
Already by  mid-1986,  some policymakers  in  the  United  States, notably 
Chairman Volcker, and many abroad, worried that further dollar depreciation 
might have adverse effects on U.S. inflation and on the world economy. In 
September,  the  G-7  issued  the  above-mentioned  declaration  that  current 
exchange  rate  levels  were  broadly  consistent  with  “fundamentals.”  On 
October  31,  1986, U.S.  Treasury  Secretary  James A. Baker  and Japanese 
Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa reiterated that ‘‘the exchange rate realign- 
ment achieved between the yen and the dollar since the Plaza Agreement is 
now broadly consistent with the underlying fundamentals.  . . .” The Bank of 
Japan cut its discount rate, and Miyazawa pledged  to stimulate the Japanese 207  Effectiveness of Foreign-Exchange Intervention 
economy  further through  tax  reform  and  additional  public  spending.14  In 
November,  short-term dollar interest rates began to edge upward. 
Disappointing news on the U.S. trade balance, disappointing implementation 
of the Japanese fiscal undertakings in the Baker-Miyazawa accord, and hints 
from U.S. officials that the dollar might need to depreciate further led to a 
renewed bout of dollar weakness in December and January. On January 21, 
Baker and Miyazawa issued a second communiquk characterizing the dollar-yen 
rate as ‘‘broadly consistent with fundamentals,”  despite a dollar depreciation 
against  the  yen  of  close  to  6  percent  since the  earlier  Baker-Miyazawa 
declaration. l5  In later attempts to relieve the  upward  pressure on their cur- 
rencies, the Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan lowered their discount rates, 
reinforcing an ongoing widening of the dollar’s interest advantage. The Bundes- 
bank’s action followed  a year  in which,  partly  as a result  of  interventions 
connected with European Monetary System (EMS) pressures and partly as a 
result of  dollar interventions,  the central bank money stock had finished far 
above the top of its target range. (The mark was revalued within the EMS on 
January 12, 1987.) The Louvre Accord, the first concerted attempt to stabilize 
currency values since the dollar turnaround of early 1985, was announced on 
February 22, 1987. 
The Louvre  Accord  resulted  in  a  period,  about  eight  months  long,  of 
approximate  stability for  the  main  industrial  country  exchange rates.  This 
broad stabilization was achieved despite continuing pressure for further dollar 
depreciation due, in part, to the persistence of a large U.S. current account 
deficit. The dollar-mark exchange rate basically remained within a 5 percent 
band during this period, while the dollar-yen rate fluctuated within a 10 percent 
band. The dollar exchange rates of the pound sterling, the French franc, the 
Canadian dollar, and the lira were also unusually stable. 
It seems apparent in retrospect that the relative exchange rate stability that 
followed  the  Louvre  meeting  was  enforced  with  the  help  of  restrictive 
monetary policy in the United States and relatively expansionary policies in 
Germany and Japan. Short-term mark and yen interest rates moved downward 
after the Louvre, remaining near, and mostly below, 4 percent until September 
1987. Germany’s central bank money stock was allowed to overshoot its 1987 
target growth  range of  3-6  percent  by  a considerable  margin;  as a result, 
German  MI and M3 both  grew  at exceptionally  rapid rates over the year. 
Japan’s money supply-whether  measured as MI or as M2 plus the stock of 
certificates of deposit-grew  at its fastest rate of the decade (in both cases well 
above  10 percent  per  year).  In  the  United  States, meanwhile,  short-term 
interest rates moved to a higher range and the growth rate of M2 was held 
below  the  bottom  of  its  target  interval;I6  in  early  September  the  Federal 
Reserve raised its discount rate from 5.5 to 6 percent. 
Interest  rate  increases  in  all  three  countries,  and  a  widening  of  the 
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of  October  19,  1987. This generalized  rise  in  interest  rates  is  sometimes 
identified as a catalyst of  the crash. The stock market plunge was immediately 
followed by a worldwide full in interest rates as investors shifted from stocks 
into bonds and as central banks acted to head off any incipient liquidity crisis; 
in the process, the interest differential in favor of dollars declined. By the end 
of  1987, the dollar had registered another decisive external decline, shattering 
the lower limit specified by the Louvre Accord. The dollar’s fall was heavily 
influenced by adverse U.S. trade news, and it occurred in spite of  an interest 
rate reduction in Japan and an even deeper reduction in Europe. The December 
G-7 meeting, as noted earlier, reaffirmed the goal of exchange rate stability and 
warned against further dollar depreciation, to no great immediate effect. 
After the dollar, buttressed by favorable trade news and more intervention, 
recovered some of its losses in January, the currency’s exchange rates against 
the yen and the mark remained in relatively narrow bands through the middle 
of June-another  period, nearly six months long, of  approximate stability. A 
new  phase  of  dollar appreciation  began  after mid-June, sparked, as noted 
above, by evidence of U.S. trade balance improvement, firming dollar interest 
rates, and  official  intimations  that  some dollar appreciation  might  now  be 
tolerated. The surprising magnitude and duration of  the dollar’s summer-time 
rise raised the worrisome possibility that progress in external adjustment might 
be slowed or even reversed. By September, however, the dollar upswing had 
moderated with the aid of sharply higher short-term interest rates in Germany. 
5.2.3  Exchange Rate Fundamentals:  Government and Private Demand 
A brief look at events impinging more directly than monetary policy on output 
markets will complete this survey of macroeconomic developments  in the recent 
period  of  exchange rate  realignment.  Table  5.1 reports  data  on  central- 
government fiscal deficits (general-government  deficits are given in parenthe- 
ses) and real domestic demand growth in the three largest economies. ” 
Important changes in fiscal positions are evident in the data. Over the course 
of the early 198Os, U.S. government deficits-central  and general alike-rose 
sharply relative to GNP; starting in 1986, a leveling off and possible reversal 
of this trend appears. Both Germany and Japan, however, display declining 
deficit ratios over the early 1980s. In the German case, this downward trend 
seems to end in  1985-86,  while  in the Japanese case, the trend  continues 
through the time of  this writing. 
In retrospect, the stabilizing of the American and German fiscal deficit ratios 
around  the  mid-1980s  stands out  as  a  key  factor behind  the  dollar-mark 
realignment that began late in the first quarter of 1985. Although Japan’s fiscal 
deficits have continued to decline throughout the 1980s, U.S. fiscal consoli- 
dation has contributed to dollar-yen realignment as well. Before 1985, market 
participants  may  have  expected the  then-divergent  trends  in  national  fiscal 
positions to continue for some time; these expectations would have contrib- 
uted, in turn, to the dollar’s appreciation against the mark and yen. Thus, the 209  Effectiveness of Foreign-Exchange Intervention 
Table 5.1  Fiscal Policy and Domestic Demand in Japan, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, and the United States, 1980-1988 
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in both issues. 
impact of fiscal policy on exchange rates in the late 1980s should not be judged 
by the sizes of actual fiscal adjustments alone. To  the extent that fiscal policy 
actions from 1985 on signaled changes in the trends of the decade’s first half, 
they would have been accompanied by changes in expected future deficit ratios 
that have an effect on exchange rates  independent  of current fiscal moves. 
Branson (1988) has insisted on the importance of such expectations effects in 
arguing  that  the  anticipated  enactment  of  the  Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
legislation  contributed to the dollar’s  1985 depreciation. 
Lacking the benefits of hindsight, market participants were able to discern 
changes in national fiscal trends only over time.  A growing perception that 
American and German fiscal trends had been altered probably contributed to 
steady downward pressure on the dollar relative to the mark and yen in 1986 
and  1987. 
Given the likely importance of fiscal policy expectations, little can be gained 
from attempts to correlate even year-to-year movements  in currency values 
with  ex post changes  in  fiscal  stance. Possibly,  more  can be  learned  from 
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deficit  changes  to  have  been  associated  with  large  shifts  in  long-term 
expectations. It is difficult in practice, however, to disentangle  the  “pure” 
exchange rate effect  of  a demand shift-which  alters the terms of  trade  at 
constant  money  price  levels-from  the expectations about  future  monetary 
policy reactions that the shift creates. Thus, an acceleration of demand growth 
in the United States can cause nominal dollar appreciation for two reasons: it 
signals the possible need for a rise in the relative price of  U.S. traded goods, 
and, if the economy is running near full capacity, it also raises the likelihood 
that the Federal Reserve will restrict monetary growth in the future. 
Since 1985, cumulative demand growth has been strongest in Japan; from 
1986, demand growth has been comparable in the United States and Germany. 
Overall demand factors are therefore  likely contributors  to the yen’s appre- 
ciation against both the dollar and the mark over the 1985-88 period. The very 
high  rate  of  U.S. demand growth in  1984 (8.7 percent)  is  noteworthy.  A 
plausible hypothesis is that the buoyant business environment associated with 
this  exceptional growth,  perhaps  coupled  with  expectations that  monetary 
tightness would be needed later to discourage inflation, kept the dollar high in 
1984 and early  1985 even after U.S. monetary  policy loosened. 
5.3  Sterilized Intervention as a Policy Instrument 
After 1985, monetary  policies in the three main industrial countries  have 
operated in a setting of relatively inflexible fiscal policies, first to amplify the 
dollar’s real depreciation in the hope of hastening current account adjustment, 
then to stabilize currencies at levels supposedly consistent with external equi- 
librium in the long run. At the same  time, each country has used monetary means 
to pursue the additional domestic goal of growth with low inflation. In a world 
of N  countries  and N  policy  tools (the individual  countries’  monetary  poli- 
cies), it is only by accident that N  domestic objectives and N -  I  exchange 
rate targets can simultaneously  be attained  in the  short run. Unless N - 1 
additional policy  instruments are available, conflicts between  internal and ex- 
ternal balance are bound to arise, as they have done continually in recent years. 
Sterilized foreign-exchange intervention furnishes N - 1 additional policy 
tools with the potential to be useful complements to monetary policies. These 
N - 1 additional  tools  are pure changes in the relative  stocks of  national 
currency bonds  held  in private  portfolios. A major difficulty in  evaluating 
intervention  is to identify  empirically  the  channels, if  any,  through  which 
intervention has significant,  lasting effects on exchange rates. 
5.3.1  The Mechanics of Intervention  and Sterilization 
Official intervention in the foreign-exchange market has the direct effect of 
altering the balance sheet of the central bank, and possibly of  other government 
agencies. U.S. intervention, for example, is carried out by  both the Federal 
Reserve and by the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) of the U.S. Treasury. 21 1  Effcctiveness of  Foreign-Exchange Intervention 
When foreign-exchange intervention is not sterilized, it can affect exchange 
rates by changing the stock of  high-powered  (or base) money, a change that 
leads to adjustments  in broader monetary aggregates, in interest rates, and in 
market expectations about future price level inflation. A stylized balance sheet 
for the German Bundesbank would show its net asset holdings-consisting  of 
net  foreign  assets  (NFA)  and  net  domestic  assets  (NDA)-equal  to  its 
monetary liabilities,  the German monetary  base (B):  ’* 
NFA  + NDA  = B. 
A nonsterilized  Bundesbank  purchase of  a  $1  million  bank  deposit  at DM 
2 per dollar, say, alters the central bank’s balance sheet by raising NFA (on the 
asset  side)  and  B  (on  the  liability  side),  both  by  DM  2  million.  The 
corresponding change in the private sector’s balance sheet is the mirror image 
of this one: a DM 2 million rise in German high-powered money holdings, and 
a DM 2  million decline in holdings of  dollar deposits. 
The Bundesbank  could sterilize this intervention’s expansionary effect on 
the monetary base through several types of offsetting operation, for example, 
a DM 2 million open market sale of mxk-denominated domestic government 
securities.  This  additional  operation  would  reduce  the  Bundesbank’s net 
domestic  assets  and its  monetary  liabilities,  both  by  DM 2 million.  Taken 
together, the two Bundesbank actions-intervention  plus sterilization-would 
leave the public with unchanged holdings of high-powered money, but with a 
higher stock of interest-bearing mark assets and a correspondingly lower stock 
of interest-bearing dollar assets. In this sense, sterilized intervention is a “pure” 
change in the relative stocks of national currency bonds held by the public, that 
is, a change that is not accompanied  by  a change in the monetary base.” 
As noted above, sterilized interventions can take many forms. Consider, for 
example, a hypothetical  forward exchange market intervention in which the 
Bundesbank  sells  three-month  forward  marks  for  forward  dollars.  This 
operation is essentially the same as the sterilized intervention just described, 
in that it increases the net stock of mark bonds held by the private sector (the 
private sector’s net claims on future delivery of marks), decreases the net stock 
of  dollar  bonds,  but  does  not  change  the  German  base.”  Operations by 
non-central  bank government agencies, such as the U.S. ESF, are automat- 
ically sterilized if the balances drawn on for intervention purposes are held in 
the private banking system, say, or in the form of government securities pur- 
chased and sold in the open market. If some of these balances are held at central 
banks, however, the agencies’  interventions may have monetary effects. 
Certain  central  bank  transactions  are  automatically  sterilized,  after 
some time  lag.  Imagine that  the  Bundesbank  lends DM  1 million  to  the 
Bank  of  France  for  intramarginal  franc  purchases  under  the  EMS  very 
short-term financing facility. At an exchange rate of  Ffr 3.5 per mark, say, 
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ANFA  = -  DM  I  million 
Balance Sheet of  the Bundesbank 
AB  =  ~  DM  1 million 
Change in  Net Assets  Change in  Monetary Liabilities 
Balance Sheet of the Bank of  France 
Change in  Net Assets  Change in  Monetary Liabilities 
ANFA  = - Ffr 3.5 million  1  AB  = - Ffr 3.5 million 
As a result of  this coordinated  intervention, there  is a symmetric monetary 
adjustment (absent immediate sterilization),  because Germany’s high-powered 
money stock rises as France’s falls. Under EMS rules, however, the increase 
in German money may be automatically sterilized if, after the statutory three 
and a half months, the Bundesbank  requests repayment of its loan in marks. 
Since repayment  leaves  the  French  central  bank’s  net  foreign  assets  the 
same-a  liability to the Bundesbank  is settled through an equal depletion of 
mark reserves-the  French monetary base can remain at its lower level. The 
German base falls, however, if the Bank of France discharges its debt to the 
Bundesbank  by  drawing  on  French  official  holdings  of  marketable  mark 
securities: 
Balance Sheet of the Bundesbank 
In  effect,  the Bank  of  France  automatically  sterilizes  the  increase in  the 
German base when it repays its loan using marketable mark reserves; the initial 
symmetry of the intervention unwinds. Such automatic sterilization would not 
occur if  France  repaid  Germany in  dollars  or, say,  in  European Currency 
Units.  21 
5.3.2 
Since sterilized intervention operates by changing the currency denomina- 
tion  of  bonds held  by  the  public,  such  changes must  affect  asset  market 
equilibrium if any exchange rate change is to result. As a matter of theory, the 
link between  government asset  swaps and equilibrium is not  immediate:  a 
government exchange of  foreign for domestic assets with domestic residents 
may wash out if private agents fully capitalize, as part of their own wealth, 
all future net taxes levied by the government. In this extreme case of Ricardian 
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equivalence between debt issue and taxes, the government cannot systemat- 
ically affect the relevant  “outside”  bond supplies, that is the net supply of 
claims on governments that the public must hold. The evidence on Ricardian 
equivalence is ambiguous, so in what follows, I will assume that government 
asset  operations  do  indeed  move  outside  asset  supplies  in  the  intended 
directions, though not necessarily on a one-for-one basis.22 
How should changes in outside  supplies of  national  currency  debt affect 
asset markets? Portfolio-balance theories of  exchange rate determination link 
relative  expected  nominal rates  of  return  on bonds  of  different  currency 
denomination to outside asset supplies. According to these theories, a wealth 
owner cares about the riskiness of a portfolio as well as the expected return 
that  it offers.  Since bonds  of  different  currency denomination are perfect 
substitutes for risk averters only under very unlikely circumstances, a change 
in outside asset supplies generally alters the risk characteristics of the market 
portfolio and thus requires an equilibrating adjustment in currencies’ relative 
expected returns. 
More precisely,  let R, be the one-period risk-free nominal interest rate on 
domestic  currency,  RT  the  corresponding  rate on  foreign currency,  Sr the 
(spot) price of foreign currency in terms of domestic, and E,(.) a conditional 
expectation, given information as of date t. Then the domestic currency payoff 
on a domestic currency bond held for one period is 1 + R,, while the expected 
domestic currency payoff on the same investment in a one-period foreign bond 
is  (1  + RT)E,(S,+,)/S,.  The portfolio-balance view  posits  that  the  return 
differential or (relative) risk premium on foreign currency, 
is a function of the outside  supplies of assets denominated in domestic and 
foreign currency. An implication is that changes in outside asset supplies, such 
as  those  caused  by  sterilized  intervention, can  alter  asset  market  prices, 
including exchange rates. The general presumption  is that, all else equal, an 
increase in the stock of domestic currency debt that the public must hold will 
raise the domestic currency  interest rate, lower the foreign currency interest 
rate, and depreciate the domestic currency in the foreign-exchange market (see 
Branson  and Henderson 1985). As note  22 above warns, however,  the ex- 
change rate effect of  a  sterilized  intervention  is  impossible  to evaluate in 
general equilibrium without a complete model of  how future macroeconomic 
policies of  all kinds adjust to keep the government within its intertemporal 
budget constraint. 
There is a large body of evidence contradicting  the hypothesis  that  pt in 
equation (1) is identically  zero, or even constant over time; Hodrick (1987) 
presents a thorough review of this evidence and of its interpretation by various 
authors. The risk premium pt could be identically zero if  investors were risk 
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currency of denomination would be perfect substitutes, implying that changes 
in  their  relative  outside  supplies  do not  necessarily  call  for equilibrating 
changes  in  relative  asset  returns.  Under  perfect  substitution, there  is  no 
meaningful distinction  (leaving aside the incentive effects to be discussed in 
sec. 5.4) between monetary changes brought about by transactions in foreign- 
exchange markets and changes of equal magnitude brought about by measures 
such as open market trades  of  domestic securities. The condition pr = 0 is 
often called the uncovered interest parity condition .23 
The statement that uncovered interest parity fails to hold is not the same as 
the  statement  that  sterilized  intervention  is effective in  moving  exchange 
rates.24 The latter statement  would be supported, however,  by econometric 
evidence that government debt supplies play a systematic role in determining 
pr. Evidence of this sort has not, however, been forthcoming. Define 
so that u,+  is uncorrelated with time-t information.  Most studies proceed by 
regressing 
on time-t government debt supplies, which are assumed to be correlated with 
the relevant  outside asset supplies. Hodrick  (1987, 1 19-28)  documents the 
failure of such tests to produce significant evidence that asset supplies affect 
risk premiums. 
Some of  the  tests  discussed  by  Hodrick  impose added  structure  on the 
problem of  relating the ex post excess return, equation (2), to outside asset 
supplies by assuming that international investors are mean-variance  optimiz- 
ers.  The  resulting  capital  asset  pricing  model  (CAPM)  implies  that  the 
coefficient in the regression  equation depends on the degree of investor risk 
aversion  and the  covariance matrix  of  unexpected  asset  returns,  which  is 
assumed not to change over time. Evidence that the covariance matrix does 
indeed  change over  time  (see Cumby  and  Obstfeld  1984)  has  led  some 
researchers  to postulate  explicitly  time-varying  covariance matrices  in esti- 
mation. Engel and Rodrigues ( 1987), Giovannini and Jorion (1  989), and Mark 
(1988) take this approach; the first two papers find evidence against versions 
of the CAPM with time-varying covariances, while the last is more favorable. 
It seems fair to say, however, that none of these models can explain more than 
a small fraction of the volatility in the ex post excess return defined by equation 
(2). Allowing for time-varying covariances in the CAPM does little if anything 
to support the view that shifts in outside asset supplies, per se, have significant 
exchange rate effects.25 
5.3.3  Consumption-Based Asset Pricing Models 
An alternative approach to modeling the risk premium views consumption 
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might underlie any effects of sterilized intervention are somewhat less direct 
than those driving portfolio-balance models. Presumably,  sterilized interven- 
tion could affect exchange rates by altering the composition of private wealth, 
and thereby altering the covariance of wealth, and hence of consumption, with 
the returns on various currencies. 
The  consumption-based  theory  builds  on  the  intertemporal  efficiency 
condition for an individual  who derives utility  u(c,) from consuming c,  in 
period t, has a subjective discount factor p, and faces the home price level P, 
in addition to home and foreign nominal interest rates R,  and RTand a nominal 
price of  foreign currency S,.  The efficiency condition is 
where 
and cov,(.) is a conditional covariance.26  The term on the right-hand side of 
equation  (3) is  (up  to a  discount  factor) the  risk  premium  p,  defined  in 
equation  (1); if  it is  identically  zero, equation (3) becomes the uncovered 
interest parity condition 
(4) 
As noted earlier, condition (4) has been tested extensively, for example, by 
testing whether the interest factor ratio is an unbiased predictor of future spot 
rate changes. Table 5.2 presents estimates of the equation 
Table 5.2  Tests Based on S,+,/S,=  a + b (1 + R,)/(l + RT) + E,+~ 
Currency  U  b  P(18)  F-stat  Significance 
Mark  2.383  -  1.364  15.76  I .036  0.363 
Yen  4.013  -  2.967  19.43  6.333  0.004 
Pound  2.289  -  1.304  32.74  3.165  0.052 
(1.742)  (1.726) 
(1.152)  (1.141) 
(0.935)  (0.939) 
Note: Quarterly data, three-month interest rates. Exchange and interest rates are end-of-quarter 
quotations. Sample period for yen is 76:2 to 86:3;  for other currencies, 75:2 to 86:3.  The @statistic 
tests for serial correlation at lags up to  18 and is distributed x2(  18) if equation errors are white 
noise. The F-statistic  tests the null hypothesis u  = 0, b =  1. Its significance is the probability 
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along with F-tests of the null hypothesis of unbiasedness, a  = 0, b =  1. (The 
time interval is three months, and the data are nonoverlapping.) Included are 
results  for the exchange rates of  the mark, the yen, and the pound  sterling 
against the dollar. The results are rather negative, and indicate that interest rate 
differences have tended to mispredict the direction of subsequent exchange rate 
change in recent years. 
To  assess the  possibility  that the results  of  table  5.2 are explained  by  a 
time-varying consumption-based risk premium, it is useful to write equation 
(3)  in a form that is comparable to equation (4). This can be done by observing 
that E,(Q,+l)  =  (1  +  Rt)-I,  which implies 
(5) 
Equation (5)  shows how depreciation,  adjusted for consumption risk, is re- 
lated to the international interest differential. The prediction of  this equation 
is  that  the  ordinary  least-squares  regression  (Sl+  l/Sl)Ql+  (1 + R,) = a + 
b(  1  + R,)/(  1 + RT) + pi+  should yield estimated coefficients of a  = 0 and 
b = 1; table 5.3 reports the results of empirical tests. For the purpose of these 
tests,  it was assumed that (1) utility is separable in consumption of  services, 
nondurables, and durables; (2)  the utility derived from any consumption cate- 
gory can be measured by a function that is isoelastic with elasticity 2 (so that 
u’[c]  is a constant times C2);  and (3)  p = 0.985 (per q~arter).’~ 
Table 5.3  Tests Based on (S,+,/S,) Q,+,(l+R,)=a+b(l+R,)I(l+R~)+p,+l 
Currency  a  b  Q( 18)  F-stat  Significance 
Consumption Data: Services 
Mark  -0.347  1.325  14.97  1.992  0.148 
Yen  2.585  -  1.567  15.R1  2.571  0.089 
Pound  0.963  0.014  30.73  2.699  0.078 
(1.855)  (1.837) 
(1.208)  ( 1.196) 
(1.071)  (I  ,076) 
Consumption Data: Nondurables 
Mark  0.804  0.193  14.40  0.792  0.4.59 
(1.817)  (1.780) 
Yen  3.069  -  2.037  17.80  2.542  0.091 
Pound  1.421  -0.438  16.39  1.464  0.242 
(I  ,365)  (1.352) 
(1.131)  (1.136) 
Nore: See footnote to table 5.2. The appendix describes the consumption data underlying the 
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While the results of table 5.3 do make the consumption-based model look 
marginally better than the simple uncovered interest parity model, they do not 
justify a large shift in priors. Figure 5.5 illustrates why the consumption-based 
model cannot go very far in explaining the risk premium; it compares the ex 
post values of the right-hand sides of equations (4) and (5),  using data for the 
first  regression  reported in  table 5.3. (This  is a  completely  representative 
picture, however.) The correlation  between these two variables is extremely 
high: price levels are not  very variable compared with exchange rates,  and 
except  at  implausibly  high levels  of  risk  aversion,  aggregate  consumption 
variability  is insufficient  to help  much in explaining excess returns  in  the 
foreign-exchange  market. 
Hodrick (1987) reviews a largely negative body of evidence on consump- 
tion based international asset pricing models.28 Slightly more favorable results 
have been reported recently by Cumby (1988), Hodrick (1989), and Obstfeld 
(1989a). Nonetheless, the low explanatory power of these models precludes any 
strong inferences about the validity of a portfolio-balance  rationale for sterilized 
intervention.  Perhaps  the point  to take  home is that ex post  exchange rate 
variability is so high relative to that of other variables  in all of  the models 
reviewed that only the weakest conclusions can be drawn from the econometric 
1976 1977 i978 1979 i980 1981 1982 1983 i984 1985 
Depreciation versus consumption-adjusted depreciation: The dollar-  Fig. 5.5 
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5.4  Intervention as a Signal to Exchange Markets 
The failure of risk models to explain the apparent deviations from uncovered 
interest  parity  has  led  some  researchers  to  conclude  that  participants  in 
exchange markets ignore easily available information about exchange rates and 
make biased exchange rate forecasts.29  Other researchers interpret the negative 
results  as  evidence  of  weaknesses  in  the  econometric  methods  and  the 
empirical risk models that have been applied.30 
Members of  both schools agree, however,  that there is a channel through 
which  sterilized intervention  can move exchange rates even when bonds  of 
different  currency  denomination are perfect  substitutes. That channel is the 
new information about economic conditions and future economic policies that 
the volume and direction of  intervention  may signal to the market indepen- 
dently  of  any  other current  policy  changes.  Marston  (1988)  provides  an 
interesting comparative discussion  of two episodes-the  Carter administra- 
tion's dollar support operations  of  late  1978, and the Plaza declaration-in 
which  sterilized  intervention  accompanied explicit  policy  announcements 
aimed at changing the course of exchange markets. 
Notice that the signaling effect of  intervention might not be detectable by 
means of  econometric tests  such as those discussed  in  section 5.3 because 
forward-rate  forecast  errors can  be  uncorrelated  with  lagged  intervention 
despite being correlated with contemporaneous intervention. This correlation 
pattern could occur if, for example, currency-denominated bonds were perfect 
substitutes, expectations were rational, and sterilized intervention helped signif- 
icantly in predicting future monetary policies. While the results of section 5.3  thus 
allow no direct inferences about the signaling effect, alternative econometric tests 
of  signaling can be designed. In a study covering the period 1977-8  I,  Dominguez 
(1988)  provides  empirical  support  for  the  proposition  that  Federal  Reserve 
intervention has at times communicated information useful for predicting future 
monetary policie~.~'  Humpage (1988), who uses a different methodology, cites 
evidence suggesting a signaling effect over the recent period from August  1984 
to August 1987. 
It must be emphasized, however, that if intervention affects exchange rates 
only through  the  signals  it  sends, then  it  is  not  a macroeconomic policy 
instrument in the same sense that monetary and fiscal policies are. Intervention 
may alter the way that monetary  policy announcements affect the exchange 
rate, for example, but it derives its power in this case entirely from its ability 
to influence market perceptions or expectations about other economic factors. 
Consideration of episodes such as those described by Marston (1988) raises 
three fundamental (and closely connected) questions about the hypothesis that 
sterilized intervention affects exchange rates through a signaling mechanism. 
First, what information is contained in interventions that is not contained in the 
verbal  policy  announcements that  frequently  complement intervention  and 
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intervention,  rather than other reallocations of  the government’s  asset port- 
folio, be particularly effective in signaling official intentions or information? 
For  example,  would  it  not  be  equally  effective  to  signal  that  currency 
depreciation is desired through open market sales of domestic bonds that are 
subsequently  “sterilized”  by  an  offsetting  increase  in  commercial  banks’ 
rediscount quotas? Third, what, if anything, assures the market that the signals 
sterilized intervention conveys are credible?  In other words, are there costs that 
discourage governments from sending deceptive signals in attempts to obtain 
short-term advantages? 
An  obvious  advantage  of  foreign-exchange  intervention  as a  signaling 
device is that it can be deployed rapidly and around the clock, with immediate 
impact in the markets where exchange rates are set. The difficulties one faces 
in taking the analysis of intervention signals beyond this observation were well 
summarized by Tobin (1  97 1, 408) in a discussion of the role of discount rate 
changes in monetary management: 
For many students of central bank policy the psychology of the announcement 
is the most important and perhaps the only important aspect of the discount 
rate. Unfortunately there is little of a systematic character that can be said 
about it. Will the public conclude from the announcement of  a fall in the 
discount rate that predictions of recession are now confirmed by the expert 
economic  intelligence  of  the  central  bank,  and  therefore  regard  the  an- 
nouncement  as a deflationary  portent? Or will  the market judge that the 
authorities have thus indicated their resolute intention of preventing deflation, 
arresting and reversing the recession, and accordingly interpret the announce- 
ment as an inflationary sign? What do the authorities themselves regard as 
the likely psychological effects of their announcements? Clearly it is easy 
to become enmeshed in a game of infinite regress between the central bank 
and the market. 
In the decades since this passage first was published,  some progress has been 
made in systematically modeling the announcement effects of sterilized interven- 
tion. It is fair to say, however, that the models put forward so far are not close to 
representing the full range of government concerns that motivate intervention. 
One reason  sterilized  intervention  may  send more informative  and more 
credible signals than announcements or other public debt management policies 
centers on the effect of  unanticipated exchange rate changes on the govern- 
ment’s net  worth. (Mussa 1981 discusses the relevance  of  this effect.) For 
example, a government  that  buys  foreign exchange on a sterilized basis- 
thereby going long in foreign currency and short in domestic-will  lose more 
money than  it  otherwise  would  have  lost  if  its  own  currency  subsequently 
appreciates by a percentage amount greater than the nominal interest differ- 
ential. Public finance considerations thus lend credibility to a government that 
uses sterilized purchases of foreign exchange to signal a future depreciation of 
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communicate a credible signal that policies to appreciate the domestic currency 
will be pursued. The expectations created when a policy authority  “puts its 
money where its mouth is” in this way can move exchange rates even under 
perfect asset substitutability. 
As an illustration, suppose that the U.S. Treasury’s ESF decides to intervene 
in marks to support the dollar’s exchange rate against the German currency. 
A hypothetical possibility is that the ESF draws on a mark credit line with the 
Bundesbank (borrowing DM 10 million, say) and purchases dollar securities 
on the open market (say, $5 million in U.S. Treasury bills at an exchange rate 
of DM 2 per dollar). The effect on the U.S. government’s balance sheet is: 
Balance Sheet of  the U.S. Government 
Change in Assets  Change in  Liabilities 
+ $5 million  I  + DM  10 million 
This intervention has no effect on the U.S. monetary base. Although its mon- 
etary effects in the United States are therefore sterilized, the intervention does 
alter U.S.  incentives:  having  gone long in dollars  and short in  marks, the 
Treasury is now more vulnerable to an unanticipated rise in the mark’s dollar 
price. Foreign-exchange  traders may therefore view the Treasury’s action as 
a signal that American policies consistent  with dollar appreciation are in store.32 
In November  1978, the announcement that  the U.S. Treasury  would  sell 
‘‘Carter bonds”  denominated  in  nondollar  currencies may  initially  have 
altered  market  forecasts  by  appearing  to  reduce  the  U.S.  government’s 
incentive  to inflate.  (The rapid  unwinding  of  the  initial  favorable  market 
response to the Carter package illustrates the pcrils of intervention signals that 
are not  backed  up promptly  by  concrete policy  changes.) Similarly,  recent 
proposals  that  the  U.S.  government  borrow  yen  rather  than  dollars,  put 
forward by the Economist magazine and others, build on the idea of stabilizing 
currency  markets  by  reducing  the  U.S.  temptation  to default partially  on 
external dollar debts through an inflation of dollar prices. 
The foregoing ideas can be formalized in the context of recent research on 
dynamic optimal taxation. Work by Lucas and Stokey (1983), Persson, Persson, 
and Svensson (1987), Calvo and Obstfeld (1990), and Obstfeld  (1989~)  has 
shown how  government debt management policies, such as changes in the 
maturity structure of government debt or in the mix between real and nominal 
public liabilities, can enhance the credibility (technically speaking, the dynamic 
consistency)  of  optimal government plans.  More generally,  alternative  debt 
strategies can alter the economy’s equilibrium  path, even when the expectations 
theory of the term structure holds and the Fisher equation links the own returns 
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The basic setup assumed in this literature is one in which the government 
must finance expenditures and debt repayments via distorting taxes, including 
the inflation tax on monetary balances. Since the real present value of its debt 
repayments  depends on policies, potential  asset revaluations  affect  the  net 
marginal  benefit  to  the  government  of  any  contemplated policy  change. 
Realizing  this  linkage, the public  uses government portfolio shifts, which 
change marginal government incentives, to predict future policy shifts. As a 
result, government asset swaps such as sterilized intervention, which might 
appear pointless at first glance, can alter expectations systematically, and can 
be analyzed by methods analogous to those that have been used to analyze the 
expectational  effects of other types of official portfolio shift. 
As suggested above, a government that buys home currency bonds and sells 
foreign bonds may reduce its own future incentives to create surprise inflation, 
and thereby lead traders to  infer that the home currency will be stronger in 
the future than they had previously believed. Given current money supplies, 
the sterilized sale of foreign currency will thus cause a spot appreciation of the 
home currency. Bohn (1988) develops a model of the type described above to 
examine the incentive effects of government operations in foreign exchange.  33 
Such models could be useful in understanding the apparently stronger effects 
of concerted, as opposed to unilateral, intervention. If the Japanese authorities 
coordinate  their  dollar purchases with official  American  sales  of  yen, the 
Japanese government’s gains from yen  appreciation, and the  U.S. govern- 
ment’s gains from dollar depreciation, both decline. The positive effect on the 
dollar’s value would be smaller if Japan intervened  alone and the American 
government’s incentives didn’t change. 
How powerful  in  practice  are the  budgetary  incentives  underlying  these 
ideas‘? In  testimony  before  Congress  shortly  after  the  Plaza  Agreement, 
Stephen H. Axilrod, then Federal  Reserve Staff Director  for Monetary  and 
Financial Policy, felt it necessary to comment on the budgetary implications 
of recent U.S. purchases of  foreign currencies. After pointing out that lower 
interest earnings on those investments  might be offset by an appreciation  of 
foreign currencies against the dollar, he concluded that any net effect “would 
be very small absolutely and relative to Treasury receipts .”34 Economic theory 
implies, however, that the cost to the government of  foreign exchange losses 
should be measured as the product of the amount of the loss and a shadow price 
reflecting the difficulty the government would encounter in replacing the lost 
resources. A government that is already running  a large deficit  will  view a 
given loss as more costly than would a government with a balanced budget. 
This is not to say that public sector losses on exchange markets have not been 
large in some years. Germany lost more than DM 9 billion on its reserves in 
1987 as a result of  the dollar’s depreciation (see table 5.6, below).  This loss 
had a substantial impact on the country’s public sector deficit and caused the 
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Interesting as they are, the public finance models are quite specialized; they 
capture only one aspect of government behavior and probably not the most 
important one. In reality, governments pursue many goals not present in these 
models, such as high employment, and respond to purely political events, such 
as sectoral pressures for protection.  Furthermore, the observability assump- 
tions of  these models, which require  full public knowledge  of  government 
preferences, constraints, and information, are inadequate for addressing some 
issues. 
Stein (1989) presents a simple incomplete information model in which the 
market cannot  directly observe  the  authorities’ utility  trade-off  between  an 
exchange rate target  and a domestic policy target.  Uncertainty  over official 
preferences prevents the market from accurately forecasting future monetary 
policy.  Because of  the temptation  to manipulate  the  current exchange rate 
through a time-inconsistent policy, the authorities cannot credibly announce 
the future level of the money supply. Surprisingly, however, the authorities can 
credibly communicate some of their private information to the market, and in 
a  way  that  favorably  affects  the  current  exchange rate.  Specifically,  the 
authorities can credibly announce a range of future exchange rate targets, even 
though the announcement of any precise policy target is not credible.  Aside 
from  rationalizing  the  recent  G-7 practice  of  indicating  only  broad  target 
ranges for exchange rates, Stein’s model suggests that intervention itself could 
provide a noisy but credible message about policymakers’ private information. 
Intervention may be costly for a government, as noted earlier, with costs that 
depend on the private information the government has. While such signaling 
costs  play  no  role  in  Stein’s  analysis,  they  may  allow  the  market  to  use 
observed interventions for more precise inferences about that data available to 
the authorities.  Asymmetric information thus provides an additional mecha- 
nism  through  which  intervention  costs  can  lend  credence  to  intervention 
signals. 
Uncertainty  has additional implications for intervention that any realistic 
analysis  must  recognize.  Policymakers  have  imperfect  information  about 
market fundamentals; for example, they usually are unable to observe directly 
shifts in comparative advantage or the location of new international investment 
opportunities. By “testing the market” through intervention, authorities may 
gain a better idea of whether particular  exchange rate movements represent 
transitory  factors that  ought to be  offset-such  as erroneous  rumors  about 
future policies-or  permanent developments that it would be unwise to resist 
through monetary adjustments. Government agencies may well lose money in 
carrying out such exploratory intervention operations, but at least part of this 
cost can be viewed as a price paid for insight into market conditions. Generally, 
individual market actors will also gain information by observing the effects of 
official interventions. 
Economics  is  still  far from  a  full  account  of  the  signals  conveyed  by 
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analyzing the signaling effects of intervention, practical analysis currently has 
no choice but to rely on an informal weighing of the myriad factors entering 
government  preferences  and  information  sets  and  influencing government 
constraints. 
5.5  Recent Foreign-Exchange Intervention: An  Assessment 
Earlier sections of this paper documented the macroeconomic adjustments 
that accompanied the dollar’s decline from its peak in early  1985, and re- 
viewed the theory and econometric evidence concerning the use of  sterilized 
intervention as an additional instrument of  macroeconomic policy alongside 
conventional monetary and fiscal policy. The econometric evidence is consistent 
with the 1983 finding of the Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention, 
cited in the introduction, that the portfolio effects of sterilized intervention are 
weak  except,  possibly, in the very  short run.  As the Working Group also 
recognized, however, the signaling effect of exchange market intervention is 
of potential importance. Unfortunately, it is difficult, except within models too 
stylized to be immediately useful to policymakers,  to design signals to the 
exchange market that are credible and therefore effective. 
Intervention, often sterilized and often concerted, has nonetheless loomed 
large in recent currency experience,  so it  is important to ask whether and 
through what channels intervention aided in promoting the 1985-88  realign- 
ment. In this section I try to answer this question by examining the timing and 
magnitudes of  interventions by  the  three  largest  industrial  countries.  The 
message in the data appears to be that monetary and fiscal actions, rather than 
sterilized interventions,  have been the dominant policy determinants of  the 
broad  exchange  rate  movements  of  recent  years.  On  several  occasions, 
however, intervention seems to have been effective in signaling to exchange 
markets  the  major  governments’  resolve  to  adjust  other  macroeconomic 
policies,  if  necessary, to achieve exchange-rate goals.  On other occasions, 
authorities have been convinced by exchange market pressures to modify these 
goals rather than to make fully accommodating monetary or fiscal changes. 
Sterilized intervention has not helped governments resolve conflicts between 
internal and external balance in any fundamental way. 
5.5.1  Intervention Data for the United States, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, and Japan,  1985-88 
Table 5.4 reports the dollar value of  net U.S. open market purchases of 
foreign currencies, both by the Federal Reserve and the ESF. For reasons to 
be  discussed in  a moment,  these data do not compretely capture quarterly 
changes in  the  U.S.  official foreign  asset position,  which  might be  more 
relevant for assessing the portfolio effects of intervention. Given its small size 
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Table 5.4  United States: Open Market Purchases of  Foreign Exchange 
Quarterly  Purchase 
1  2  3  4 
1985  0.7  0.0  0.2  3.1 
1986  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1987  -  1.5  -3.4  0.3  -  3.9 
1988  -  1.0  2.4*  2.1**  - 
Source: Data for 1985-87  from IMF, World Economic Outlook (April 1988): table 22; 1988 data 
from Federal Reserve Bulletin  (April  1988, July 1988, October 1988, and February  1989). 
Note: Purchases (+) and sales (-)  in billions of  U.S.  dollars. 
*Includes intervention purchases of foreign exchange during July. 
**August and September only. 
aspect  of  U.S. intervention  is  its  possible  signaling  effect, which  is well 
captured by the data on market transactions  reported  in table 5.4. 
Table  5.5 reports changes in  the dollar values  of  German and Japanese 
foreign-exchange  reserves.  The numbers  in  table  5.5 include, along  with 
changes in central-bank reserve holdings, changes in the net foreign claims of 
other government agencies that intervene in financial markets. Also included 
Table 5.5  The Federal Republic of  Germany and Japan: Increase in Dollar 
Value of Foreign Exchange Reserves 
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (April  1988): table 23; and IMF, Internatioiial Financial 
Statistics (March 1989): line  1d.d. 
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are  fluctuations  in  the  dollar  value  of  existing  nondollar  reserves  that  are 
induced entirely by exchange rate changes; but despite this valuation discrep- 
ancy, the numbers in table 5.5 are reasonably well correlated with the dollar 
value of actual foreign-exchange acquisitions by the two countries’ authorities. 
Because  of  German EMS interventions,  the  reported  series is significantly 
more reliable as an indicator of dollar acquisitions for Japan than for Germany. 
The intervention series probably most useful in assessing the pressure of 
intervention on domestic financial markets is the domestic currency value of 
official  foreign  asset acquisitions-essentially,  the  balance  of  payments  in 
domestic currency. This variable captures the incipient  addition to domestic 
base money resulting from intervention. Table 5.6  reports quarterly data on the 
mark  value of Bundesbank  acquisitions of reserve  assets.  Capital gains on 
existing reserves, which are excluded from the acquisition data, appear in the 
second column.35 Such capital gains do not put direct pressure on domestic 
financial markets, but they can have significant consequences for the govern- 
ment’s finances. 
Some caveats applying to all of the data are in order. Even in the absence 
of valuation changes, the figures in tables 5.5 and 5.6 may differ considerably 
from  outright  official  purchases  of  foreign  exchange in  the  open  market. 
Table 5.6  The Federal Republic of Germany: Bundesbank Foreign Asset 
Acquisitions and Capital Gains 































-  1.5 
22.1 
-2.9 
-  10.0 
-  22.3 
0.6 
4.2 
-  2.7 
-2.3 
-  2.3 
-  1.0 
1.1 
-  1.0 








-  0.7 
Note: Acquisitions and gains (+) in billions of marks. 
Source: Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank (April 1989): table IX. 1. For a more precise 
description of  “capital  gains,” see footnote 6 to table IX. 1. Asset acquisitions are “Change in 
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Interest  earnings  on  the  Bundesbank’s dollar  assets,  for  example,  when 
reinvested  in  dollars, swell  the bank’s net  foreign assets, even though  no 
transaction in the foreign-exchange market is directly involved. As argued by 
Adams  and  Henderson  (1983),  however,  such  reinvestment  is  correctly 
thought  of  as intervention, since the German government could  have used 
dollar interest earnings to reduce the flow of mark-denominated  government 
debt into private portfolios, simultaneously leaving more dollar bonds for the 
private market to hold. There are, in addition, some problems of measurement 
related  to off-balance-sheet  items,  end-of-quarter  ‘‘window dressing”  of 
balance sheets, and so on. 
5.5.2  Intervention and the Exchange Markets 
An informal review of tables 5.4-5.6  in the light of the narrative of section 
5.2 provides a vantage from which to evaluate recent intervention experience. 
Pre-Plaza period  (January-September  1985). Table  5.6 shows that  the 
Bundesbank intervened heavily in the first quarter of 1985 to stop the dollar’s 
rise to its peak; the United States intervened at the same time, but on a much 
smaller  scale. The Bundesbank  sterilized  its intervention-in  the Bundes- 
bank’s published monetary survey, the reduction in central bank money due to 
foreign-exchange  flows  in  the  first  quarter of  1985 (DM  12.2 billion)  is 
accompanied  by  an unusually  large  domestic open-market purchase  under 
repurchase  agreement  (DM  12.1 billion).  Short-term  mark  interest  rates 
showed only a temporary and relatively small increase in this quarter.36  In the 
two subsequent quarters,  the German authorities  purchased  dollars  as the 
dollar depreciated, and took advantage of the mark’s relative strength to lower 
interest rates in the face of a weak domestic economy. Japan’s foreign reserves 
(measured in dollars) show a net rise over these two quarters (table 5.5); the 
United States, for the most part, stayed on the sidelines (table 5.4). All told, 
the period shows no sustained, coordinated  attempt to drive the dollar down 
through intervention. 
Plaza to Louvre (September 1985-February  1987). In the last quarter of 
1985 the  United  States and  Japan,  backing  up the  Plaza  Agreement, both 
intervened  to push the dollar down. Germany also carried  out open market 
dollar sales, but once nonmarket transactions are taken into account, its foreign 
reserves show a net increase for the quarter (tables 5.5 and 5.6). Intervention 
clearly did little to promote the dollar’s depreciation over 1986; U.S. activity 
was insignificant,  and Japan bought  dollars to counteract yen  appreciation. 
Indeed, by the second half of 1986, the Bundesbank had joined Japan in trying 
to brake the dollar’s fall through dollar purchases, but the resulting interven- 
tions  were  allowed  to have  no substantial  effect  on interest  rates  in  either 
country  and were ineffe~tive.~’  Only after Germany and  Japan decisively 
lowered interest rates  in January 1987, and the United  States intervened  at 
month’s  end,  did  the  dollar  stabilize  briefly;  from  end-October  1986 to 
end-January  1987, the dollar price of marks had risen by 14.3  percent and that 227  Effectiveness of  Foreign-Exchange Intervention 
of  yen by 5.9 percent. The Bundesbank  has summarized  the experience  of 
intervention in the months before the Louvre accord as follows: 
These [intervention] efforts were in vain, not least because statements by 
U.S. officials repeatedly aroused the impression on the markets that the U.S. 
authorities wanted the dollar to depreciate further. Moreover, until then [late 
January 19871  the Americans hardly participated in the operations to support 
their currency. Nor did the Federal Reserve counteract the downward trend 
in the dollar through monetary polic  measures, despite the risks to price 
Evidently, pure intervention by Japan and Germany had little effect compared 
with  concrete  monetary  policy  actions,  favorable  news  on  the  U.S. trade 
balance,  a pointedly  visible  reentry  of  the  United  States  into the  foreign- 
exchange market, and a more straightforward American acknowledgment that 
the time for dollar stabilization had come.39 
From the Louvre to the crash (February-October  1987). After the Louvre 
Accord,  the yen appreciated  substantially in spite of heavy Japanese  dollar 
purchases in the first half of 1987 (table 5.5). (Germany’s sizable intervention 
in the first quarter of  1987 was  motivated  largely by  an EMS realignment 
episode.)  On March  11, the  United  States bought  $30 million  in marks to 
counteract heavy private sales of the German currency. Pressure on the mark 
rapidly  subsided, but then the yen  began to appreciate.  Between March 23 
and  April  6, the Federal  Reserve intervened daily and purchased  a total  of 
$3  .O billion with yen; between April 7 and 17, the Federal Reserve intervened 
on three occasions, buying $532 million.40 These operations marked the first 
major U.S. intervention in foreign-exchange markets since the Plaza period in 
late 1985, but intervention now aimed at supporting the dollar, not bringing 
it down. The Bundesbank and other European central banks also participated 
in these dollar support operations.  Pressure on the yen eased only after the 
dollar-yen  interest  differential  widened  substantially  (see  fig.  5.4),  and 
industrial country exchange rates remained roughly stable until the worldwide 
stock market crash in October. As noted above, this stability owed much to 
monetary policies. 
From the crash to the Toronto Summit (October  1987-June  1988). Con- 
certed official purchases of dollars began at the end of October and continued 
through January. All three countries intervened heavily to support the dollar, 
and as a result of these and earlier operations, the overall increases in German 
and Japanese foreign reserves over 1987 are remarkably large. In spite of this 
heavy intervention, the dollar depreciated by  16.2 percent against the mark, 
and  by  18.5 percent  against  the  yen,  between  end-September  and  end- 
December 1987, before partially recovering and stabilizing in the last part of 
January  1988.  From  then  until  mid-June,  the  dollar-mark  and  dollar-yen 
exchange rates fluctuated within relatively narrow ranges. The United States 
conducted moderate dollar support operations in March and April of  1988, 
while Japan intervened more heavily to discourage yen appreciation. Germany, 
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however,  allowed its reserves  to fall during the period, presumably  to help 
counteract a perceived weakness of  the mark. Short-term mark interest rates 
also drifted upward  after the end of January.  Until the second half of June, 
however, the interest differential favoring dollar over mark  assets increased. 
Toronto to Berlin (June-September  1988). Several developments, already 
reviewed above, led to a sharp appreciation of  the dollar in June. The U.S. 
began intervening to discourage the dollar’s rise on June 27; foreign-exchange 
operations by the U.S. and foreign authorities, sometimes on a large scale, 
continued through  the  summer. (Japan’s  dollar reserves  rose  in this  period 
despite the  dollar’s  strength, but  the  Bundesbank  sold  DM 22.3 billion  in 
reserves in the third quarter of  1988 alone.) By early September the dollar 
appeared once again to have stabilized; but from end-May to end-August, the 
U.S. currency had appreciated  by 7.9 percent  against the mark and by  7.2 
percent against the yen, despite forceful  intervention  efforts by  the Federal 
Reserve and foreign central banks. 
5.5.3 
International currency experience since 1985 lends little support to the idea 
that  sterilized  intervention  has been  an important determinant of exchange 
rates. Anecdotal as well as econometric evidence suggests  that intervention has 
been useful as a device for signaling to exchange markets official views on 
currency  values.  The  signals  sent  by  intervention  have  been  effective, 
however, only when they have been backed up by the prompt adjustment of 
monetary policies, or when events such as unexpected trade balance news have 
coincidentally  altered  market  sentiment. Concerted intervention  operations 
have  naturally  been  the  most  convincing, since international  agreement on 
exchange rate  objectives ensures  that  national  authorities  will  not  act  at 
cross-purposes, as they did around the end of  1986. 
Except possibly in 1987 and 1988, the scale of intervention was simply too 
small to have had significant portfolio effects. Between the Plaza Agreement 
on September 22 and the end of October 1985, the G-10 countries as a group 
sold around $7 billion in the market, hardly enough to make a major difference 
to global asset ~upplies.~’  The Plaza Agreement seems, however, to have sent 
an important signal that derived some of its credibility from the rapid progress 
of protectionist legislation through the U.S. Congress. Despite the dollar’s fall, 
protectionist pressures remained  strong over the next three years, and these 
may have reduced the credibility of later attempts to stabilize exchange rates 
in the face of slow trade balance adjustment. 
Intervention totals for 1987-88  are much higher than for 1985 or 1986, but 
even so, the intervention provided at best a partial brake on exchange market 
pressures. Germany’s official external  asset acquisitions in  1987 were DM 
41.2 billion (table 5.6), equal to roughly  one-third of its year-end  currency 
stock. Most of this reserve inflow was sterilized through domestic open market 
operations, however,  and  Germany’s stock of  high-powered  central  bank 
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money rose by only DM 15.5 billion in 1987. In 1986, when reserve inflows 
were much lower, central bank money rose by DM 13.1  billion. How large were 
the effects of this DM 41.2 billion inflow on the supply of mark-denominated 
bonds? The IMF estimates that the net stock of German general government 
debt was 2 1.8 percent of GNP, or DM 440.4  billion, in 1987. The year’s reserve 
inflow thus represented  9.4 percent of Germany’s net public debt-a  large 
number, but not large enough to prevent a sharp mark appreciation against the 
dollar.42 It is doubtful that sterilized interventions on this scale could be the 
norm in a viable target-zone system. As noted above, the interventions had an 
adverse effect on Germany’s public finances serious enough to spark political 
debate. 
Japan, too, sterilized much of the massive reserve inflow it experienced as 
a result of its own 1987 interventions. Foreign assets of the Japanese monetary 
authorities increased by  Y 5.1 trillion in that year, yet high-powered money 
rose by only Y 2.8 trillion, compared with a rise of Y 2.4 trillion in 1986.43 
IMF estimates put Japan’s 1987 net general government debt at 21.7 percent 
of GNP, or Y 74.8 trillion.44 So Japan’s Y 5.1 trillion  1987 reserve increase 
amounted to 6.8 percent of the net public debt. (And this figure understates the 
effect on yen-denominated asset supplies because it includes yen capital losses 
on official Japanese foreign reserves, suffered as a result of the dollar’s 1987 
depreciation.) Although too large and costly to become a way of  life for the 
Japanese  government,  the  intervention  of  1987  still  did  not  prevent  a 
substantial yen appreciation over the course of that year. 
Shifting fiscal trends contributed to the dollar’s fall from its peak of early 
1985, but it is monetary policy that has been the more important instrument 
of  medium-term exchange rate management.  On several occasions, officials 
chose to adjust their exchange rate objectives in the face of market pressure, 
rather than compromise domestic policy goals.  Substantial departures from 
internationally  agreed  exchange  rate  targets  occurred,  in  spite  of  heavy 
intervention, in the three months after the Louvre Accord, in the three months 
following the October 1987 stock market crash, and in the summer of  1988. 
Outcomes such as those described above could occur in a world where the 
portfolio effects of sterilized intervention are very potent: it is at least a logical 
possibility that the mark and yen would have appreciated far more against the 
dollar than they did in 1987 had the massive interventions of that year not been 
carried  out. To  settle the  question  definitively,  economists  would  need  a 
generally acceptable structural exchange rate model in which a counterfactual 
scenario with no intervention could be simulated. After many fruitless attempts 
to pin down econometrically significant portfolio effects due to intervention, 
however, it seems more reasonable to take governments’ repeated failures to 
keep exchange rates within agreed ranges at face value: portfolio effects either 
are  absent  or  are  so  small  and  uncertain  that  only  unacceptably  high 
intervention  levels  would  have  succeeded  in  maintaining  exchange  rate 
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appears to support this  face-value interpretation. For example, Humpage’s 
(1988) study of daily data on intervention and exchange rates concludes that 
‘‘frequent  or otherwise systematic intervention  that  does not  provide new 
information to the market will not affect exchange rates,”  and that beyond any 
signaling effect, “exchange-market intervention has no apparent influence on 
day-to-day exchange-rate  movements”  (15). 
With  a  reliably  significant  and  sustained  portfolio  effect  on  exchange 
markets, sterilized intervention could ease international policy cooperation by 
giving each country an additional policy instrument that might help it attain 
external as well as internal targets. In the absence of this additional instrument, 
however, authorities inevitably encounter dilemmas as a result of attempts to 
gear monetary policy to exchange rate stabilization alone. A nominal exchange 
rate fixed by monetary means provides an efficient automatic offset to purely 
monetary  disturbances,  but  a  monetary  policy  that  steadies  the  nominal 
exchange rate when real exchange rate adjustment is still  necessary  can be 
counterproductive. It causes some combination  of  unnecessary  deflation  at 
home  and  inflation  abroad when  a  real depreciation of  home  currency is 
needed, and it causes some combination of  unnecessary inflation at home and 
deflation abroad when real appreciation is needed.46 The “black Monday” of 
October 1987 has often been attributed to fears that the Federal Reserve would 
raise interest rates further to keep the dollar within its Louvre limits, despite 
the apparent incompatibility of the prevailing real exchange rate with external 
balan~e.~’  Had the Federal Reserve taken this course, the real dollar depre- 
ciation that occurred  after the stock-market crash  would have been  brought 
about, not by a relatively painless fall in the dollar’s nominal value, but by a 
recession originating  in the United States. 
Appendix 
The following data were used in the econometric work of section 5.3 and in 
constructing figures 5.1-5.5. 
Nominal interest rates (R,  R*):  Three-month Eurocurrency  rates, observed 
at month’s end, from Data Resources, Inc. (DRI). 
Spot  exchange rates  (S):  End-of-month  observations from OECD, Main 
Economic Indicators, various issues. 
Real per capita U.S. consumption (c)  and price level (P):  Separate season- 
ally  unadjusted  series  on  nominal  consumption  of  services  and  of  non- 
durables were deflated by seasonally unadjusted price indexes for consumption 
of  services and of  nondurables, then divided by  seasonally  unadjusted  data 
on  the  civilian  noninstitutional  population  of  the  United  States.  The  re- 
sulting per capita real  consumption data were  deseasonalized by  log-linear 231  Effectiveness of Foreign-Exchange Intervention 
regression. Population data from Economic Report of  the President, February 
1988,  and from  U.S. Department of  Labor,  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics, 
Employment and Earnings. Consumption and price data from DRI. 
Notes 
1. See “Report  of the Deputies: The Functioning of the  International  Monetary 
System,” Supplement on the Group of Ten Deputies’ Report, IMF Survey (July 1985): 
2. The Group of Five ((3-5)  countries are France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Group of Seven ((3-7) consists 
of the G-5 plus Canada and Italy; the Group of Ten (G-lo), of the G-7 plus Belgium, 
the Netherlands,  and Sweden. 
3. A recent survey of research on sterilized intervention is found in Weber (1986). 
The conclusions of Federal Reserve participants  in the Versailles Working Group are 
summarized by  Henderson and Sampson (1983). 
4. Throughout  this paper, a currency  is said, synonymously, to appreciate, rise, 
strengthen, or increase in value against a foreign currency when its price in terms of 
the foreign currency rises. When that price falls, the currency is said to depreciate, fall, 
weaken, or decline in value against the foreign currency. 
2-  14. 
5. IMF, World Economic Outlook (April 1989): table A31. 
6. The cited changes are based on end-of-month exchange rates, expressed as dollars 
per foreign currency unit. Between December  1978 and August 1985, the U.S.  price 
level had risen by  a greater percentage  than Japan’s or Germany’s  had,  so even a 
complete reversal of the nominal exchange rate movements up to February 1985 would 
not have restored the real exchange rates prevailing at the period’s start. 
7. The dollar’s September surge is not visible in the end-of-month data plotted in 
figures 5.1 and 5.2. 
8. See “Group of Seven Countries Agrees to Intensify Policy Coordination,”  IMF 
Survey  (1 I  January  1988): 8- 10; and  “Ministers  Stress  Exchange  Rate  Stability, 
Oppose Global Debt-Forgiveness Plans,”  IMF Survey  (18 April  1988): 116. Earlier 
communiquks are reproduced in full in Funabashi (1988). 
9. The important role of  trade balance reports  in explaining recent exchange rate 
behavior  does  not  contradict  the  asset  market  theory  of  exchange  rates.  It  is 
unanticipated trade balance movements and trade balance data revisions that have had 
the greatest effects on currencies because such surprises change market assessments of 
the long-run real and nominal exchange rates consistent with external balance. For a 
formal model,  see Mussa (1979). The effects on current exchange rates of  shifts in 
expected long-run equilibrium exchange rates often are amplified by anticipated policy 
responses to the news. For example, a market belief that the Federal Reserve is likely 
to  ease  monetary  policy  following  an unexpectedly  negative  trade  balance  report 
increases the dollar’s tendency to depreciate immediately afterward. 
10. See, for example, Dornbusch (1976). In Dornbusch’s model, monetary expansion 
could cause an immediate rise in the short-term nominal interest rate if output were to 
respond immediately and strongly to monetary expansion. This possibility does not seem 
very relevant to the three main industrial countries. Central bankers seem confident of 
their ability to lower short-term interest rates in the short run, and some formal econo- 
metric tests (such as tests based on money announcements) support their view. 232  Maurice Obstfeld 
11. See IMF, World Economic Outlook (April  1988): 63, chart 19. 
12.  Volcker’s  February  20,  1985,  testimony  before  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs is reproduced in Federal Reserve Bulletin  71 
(April 1985): 211-21. 
13.  See  “Treasury  and  Federal  Reserve  Foreign Exchange  Operations:  Interim 
Report,”  Federal Reserve Bulletin 72 (February 1986): 110. 
14. Funabashi (1988, 274-75). 
15. Funabashi (1988,  161  -63)  suggests that Japanese authorities manipulated the 
Tokyo foreign-exchange  market  to  bring  about  the  yen  depreciation  that  occurred 
between the conclusion of the first Baker-Miyazawa deal in September  1986 and its 
announcement a month later. 
16. IMF, World Economic Outlook (April 1988): 63, chart  19. The money growth 
rates cited in this paragraph are changes in annual averages (table A14, 125). Since the 
October 1987 stock market crash caused some easing of monetary policies, a measure 
of money growth more relevant for assessing the domestic policy impact of the Louvre 
Agreement may be the growth rate of money for the year ending in September 1987. 
(A  year-long  interval  is  choscn  to  correct  for  money-supply  seasonality.)  From 
end-September 1986 through the same time in 1987, growth rates of Japan’s monetary 
aggregates and of German MI are not very different from the figures cited; growth of 
German M3 is 6.4 percent, which is, however, higher than the upper limit for 1988 M3 
growth (6 percent) set by  the Bundesbank in January of that year. 
17. Domestic demand is the sum of domestic consumption and investment demand, 
both private and public. Domestic demand growth rather than output growth is reported 
because the former variable is a more direct measure of pressure on the exchange rate. 
In the Mundell-Fleming model, for example, an increase in domestic demand can cause 
the home currency to appreciate even though output does not change. (See Mundell 
1968; a more recent analytical discussion of the effects of demand factors on real and 
nominal exchange rates is in Obstfeld 1985.) The movements in government deficits 
reported above, though not cyclically or inflation adjusted, are broadly consistent (in 
recent years) with changes in the IMF’s fiscal impulse measures. 
18. Central bank net worth is ignored for simplicity of  exposition. See Adams and 
Henderson (1983)  for a more  detailed  discussion  of  intervention  practices.  Kenen 
(1988, ch. 5)  discusses some asymmetries in current intervention arrangements. 
19. My discussion draws a perhaps artificially sharp distinction between “money” 
and “bonds,”  and lumps all interest-bearing assets together under the latter category. 
As  a practical  matter,  financial authorities  have available a rich  menu  of  financial 
operations, across liquidity categories, maturities,  and currencies. I judge an inter- 
vention to be sterilized when it has no effect on the monetary base, defined as the stock 
of  reservable  central  bank  liabilities,  including  currency;  and  I  exclude from  the 
definition of  “bonds”  any interest-bearing reserves of the domestic banking system 
held at the central bank. 
20.  I leave maturity issues aside for the purpose of this example. 
21. For simplicity, this example has abstracted entirely from interest payments. Of 
course, the intervention’s effects would be reversed entirely if the Bank of France went 
to the open market to purchase the needed marks with high-powered francs. 
22. Pure intervention has no effect on exchange rates in a Ricardian setting for the 
same reason that private  firms’ decisions  on the currency of  denomination  of  their 
borrowing may have no effect. (See Froot, ch. 8 in this volume.) Stockman (1979) and 
Obstfeld  (1982)  discuss  the  relation  between  Ricardian  equivalence  and  in- 
tervention  effects.  As  illustrated  in  those  papers,  and  as  stressed  more  recently 
by  Backus  and  Kehoe  (1989),  the  analysis  of  intervention  cannot  be  conducted 
independently of an analysis of the resulting effects on the government’s intertemporal 
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Thus, if pure intervention disturbs asset market equilibrium because taxes are distorting, 
the effect of intervention would depend heavily on which taxes (if any) need to be adjusted 
afterward to ensure government solvency. In principle, it is easy to imagine that a given 
intervention could have a wide variety of effects, depending on how its budgetary impact 
is accommodated. (The same point naturally applies to the evaluation of any other policy.) 
Section 5.4 below discusses the linkage between intervention and government budget 
constraints from the perspective of policy credibility. 
23. Engel and Flood (1985, 314) argue that “certain types of sterilized intervention 
can be effective in temporarily altering exchange rates, even in the presence of uncovered 
interest parity.” They give as an example a (nonsterilized) sale of foreign bonds by the 
central bank, accompanied by a temporary rise in monetary transfer payments that holds 
the money supply constant and simultaneously raises private net wealth at the initial 
money price level. A key feature of  this policy package is, however, thejscal policy 
change that accompanies the central bank’s foreign-exchange  intervention.  It is not 
surprising that a fiscal change accompanied by  a nonsterilized  intervention disturbs 
equilibrium, even when the money supply remains constant as a result of the combined 
policy actions. 
24. The implication of Ricardian equivalence, that the government does not change 
outside  asset  supplies  when  it  conducts  sterilized  intervention,  has  already  been 
mentioned.  Backus  and  Kehoe  (1989),  in  a non-Ricardian  model  with risk-averse 
investors,  present  other  examples  of  sterilized  interventions  that  have  no  effects. 
Suppose that the dollar-mark rate will be  $S(w)  per mark next period if  the state of 
nature o  occurs, and imagine two bonds with respective payoffs of DM  1 and $S(o) 
in state w, and with a common payoff of zero in other states. These securities are perfect 
substitutes because they have the same payoff in every state of  nature; intervention 
operations that change their relative supplies thus have no effects, in spite of the fact 
that the bonds’ face values differ in currency of denomination. Backus and Kehoe 
present further examples, all of which involve operations in securities which are perfect 
substitutes (despite private risk aversion) because of  their identical  state-contingent 
payoffs. These examples  are of  limited practical relevance  for evaluating sterilized 
intervention, since the securities traded in reality do not have identical payoffs across 
states of nature, and therefore are not generally perfect substitutes for investors. 
25. The  work just  reviewed  relies  on  some  version  of  the  ARCH  specification 
proposed by Engle (1982) to model time variation in covariances.  Pagan and Hong 
(1988) question the adequacy of the ARCH specification on empirical grounds. 
26. See Hodrick (1987) for a derivation. 
27. Consumption of durables is not considered in the tests for reasons outlined by 
Grossman  and  Laroque  (1990).  Because  of  the  deseasonalization  I  performed  in 
constructing  the  consumption-adjusted  depreciation  series  used  in  table  5.3, the 
reported standard errors are subject to a (hopefully minor) asymptotic inconsistency. 
See the appendix for a description of the seasonal adjustment procedure used. 
28. For some additional negative evidence, see Kaminsky and Peruga (1987). 
29. Froot and Frankel (1989) suggest this as one possible explanation (among others) 
for the results of their study of  survey data on exchange rate expectations. 
30.  One type of  econometric problem, which arises when large infrequent inter- 
ventions can disturb the data-generating process, is the “peso problem.”  (See Lewis 
1988 and Obstfeld  1989b for discussions.)  Peso problems  are clearly  of  potential 
relevance in analyzing recent exchange market data. 
31.  Dominguez  shows that  in  the  period  from  the  Federal Reserve’s  monetary- 
targeting shift in October 1979 until the following spring, there is a significant positive 
relationship between money surprises (defined as Federal Reserve money announce- 
ments less Money Market  Survey forecasts) and official U.S.  purchases of  foreign 
currencies  carried  out  in  the  interval  between  forecast  and  announcement.  Her 234  Maurice Obstfeld 
interpretation is that the Federal Reserve used intervention to signal information about 
monetary policy not reflected in the prior market forecast. 
32.  The  intervention  does  raise  Germany’s  monetary  base  by  DM  10  million 
(assuming  the  Bundesbank doesn’t  sterilize), but  the  currency  composition  of  the 
Bundesbank’s balance sheet is not changed. 
33. Backus and Kehoe (1989) also mention the possible strategic effects of sterilized 
intervention,  but do not suggest a particular  model.  Bohn’s account stresses that a 
nationalistic government will be motivated not only by its own budgetary needs but by 
its potential ability to alter the net real foreign asset position of the domestic private 
sector. For example, if domestic nationals have a net foreign debt denominated in home 
currency, the government has  an  added incentive to inflate. The welfare effects of 
policy-induced wealth redistributions from foreigners to  domestic residents are likely 
to be large compared with the costs of  tax distortions (which determine the welfare 
value of wealth transfers from the domestic public to the government).  If bonds are 
perfect  substitutes,  however,  individual  portfolio  composition  is  indeterminate  in 
equilibrium, as is the direction of the wealth redistribution associated with an exchange 
rate change. In this setting, the government might well lack sufficient information to 
calculate the effect on net foreign wealth various actions. Even if U.S. Treasury bonds 
were  initially  placed  with  Japanese  investors,  say, there is nothing  to  prevent  the 
original buyers from quickly selling the bonds to Americans in the secondary market 
and investing the proceeds in, say, sterling. Watson et a]. (1986, 39) note that “it  is 
not possible to obtain information on the ownership of new or outstanding international 
bonds .’ ’ 
34. Federal Reserve Bulletin (January 1986): 17. 
35. The coverage of table 5.6 is potentially broader than that of table 5.5 because 
table 5.5 excludes foreign assets other than those classified by  the IMF as foreign- 
exchange reserves, for example, SDRs and the IMF reserve position. Notice that the 
capital gains reported in table 5.6  are changes in the mark (not dollar) value of reserves; 
in some quarters, these data measure capital gains inexactly because they include SDR 
allocations. 
36. See Monthly Report  of the Deutsche Bundesbank (December 1986): table 1.3. 
37.  On  Bundesbank  dollar  purchases  over  1986,  see  Report  of  the  Deutsche 
38. Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank for the Year 1986, 63. 
39. The U.S. intervention, however, amounted to a mere $50 million in yen sold on 
January 28, 1987 (Federal Reserve Bulletin [May 19871: 333). This intervention was 
intended to underscore the second Baker-Miyazawa statement, issued January 2 1 (see 
above). 
Bundesbank for the  Year 1987, 29. 
40. See Federal Reserve Bulletin (July 1987): 553-55. 
41. See Federal Reserve Bulletin (February 1986): 112. As noted earlier, this figure 
may overstate the true extent of intervention because it omits such factors as interest 
earnings on dollar reserves. Feldstein (1986) argues that the intervention that followed 
the Plaza Agreement had little effect on exchange rates. 
42. See Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank (April 1989): table 1.3; IMF, 
World Economic Outlook (April 1989): table 22. To assess the intervention’s effect on 
relative bond  supplies, the entire foreign reserve  inflow (and not just the  sterilized 
portion)  is counted  as an addition  to the  stock  of  outstanding  mark  debt, because 
monetary-base growth not brought about by foreign asset purchases would otherwise 
have been brought about by purchases of mark assets. 
43. See IMF, International Financial Statistics (October 1988), lines 11 and 14. As 
noted below, the dollar depreciated over 1987, so the Y  5.1 billion figure understates 
the expansionary pressure on Japan’s money supply: it includes the negative effect of 235  Effectiveness of Foreign-Exchange Intervention 
capital losses on official dollar reserves measured in yen. Such capital losses do not 
directly reduce the high-powered money supply. 
44. See IMF, World Economic Outlook (April 1989): table 22. 
45. If  intervention has  some small but  reliable  portfolio  effect,  why don’t  gov- 
ernments exploit it to the maximum extent to  hit exchange rate targets? In principle, 
nothing  prevents  governments  from  taking  unlimited  open  positions  in  foreign 
exchange. Surely part of the answer is that governments themselves regard the effects 
of intervention as being unreliable. If a government is not confident that it can control 
the  exchange  rate  by  intervening,  a  large  open  foreign-exchange  position  would 
seriously restrict other macroeconomic policy choices by placing budgetary stability at 
risk.  In  addition,  governments  wish to keep the  option of  changing exchange  rate 
targets. 
46.  The  responses  of  alternative  exchange  rate  regimes  to  various  shocks  are 
analyzed in Obstfeld (1985). Controls on cross-border capital movements are a possible 
way out of the dilemma of  instrument insufficiency, but it is fanciful to think that a 
reversal of the trend toward more global financial markets is fully enforceable or, at the 
moment, politically feasible. 
47. See, for example, Feldstein (1988). 
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Comment  J. S. Flemming 
Maurice Obstfeld’s survey is thorough in its treatment of intervention by the 
G-3 countries,  and  in  its  discussion  of  their  changing  attitudes  toward 
intervention during the period since the Versailles Summit of June 1982-from 
which the Jurgensen group emerged. He looks at the theory of and econometric 
tests of effectiveness, as well as at the historical narrative, and concludes that 
(sterilized) intervention is not a very effective supplement to monetary  and 
fiscal policies affecting exchange rates-a  judicious conclusion from which I 
would not wish to dissent. I do however have six comments. 
1. In section 5.2.1 attention is drawn to the fact that, although in September 
1986 G-7 finance ministers saw no need for “further significant exchange rate 
adjustment,”  within six months the dollar had fallen 5- 15 percent. 
One strand running through the whole process of bringing the dollar down 
to earth has been a disjunction between the implication of ex ante statements 
(“the present rate is about right”) and action when the rate changes (very little) 
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and  satisfaction is again expressed  at the new level.  Despite all the talk  of 
credible commitment to published (monetary) targets, the aim seems to be to 
prevent interest rate differentials reflecting exchange adjustments which are (at 
least with hindsight) recognized as (having been) necessary. 
Given the implications for the U.S. bond market of the interest rate rise 
required  in  early  1985,  had  the  subsequent  decline  in  the  dollar  been 
anticipated, ambivalence may have been warranted. The strategy was certainly 
successful; as time passes,  however, one would expect the trick to be more 
difficult to repeat and the attempt to be perceived to become more costly. 
2. In his discussion of sterilization, Obstfeld refers to the sharpness of the 
distinction  between  “money”  and  “bonds,”  where  the  latter  includes  all 
interest-bearing assets. In the first half of the period under review, we in the 
United Kingdom  used  a technique  of  debt management  to control a broad 
monetary  aggregate  (including  interest-bearing  [“bond”?]  elements)  which 
almost certainly  worked by twisting the yield curve. We had a great deal of 
inconclusive discussion of  the exchange rate effect of this policy of  “over- 
funding.”  Could one say something about the differing degrees of substitut- 
ability at different maturities and infer from that the direction of exchange rate 
pressure generated by the policy? 
3. Obstfeld mentions the possibility of bonds in different currencies being 
perfect substitutes. That would imply not only that overfunding did not affect 
the exchange rate but also that it could not have affected the growth of the 
money supply either-which  is rejected by our evidence. 
In any case, I find the hypothesis profoundly unattractive for its implications 
that portfolios of a heterogeneous population will typically be undiversified 
and liable to jump from one comer to another. 
4. As far as models of this area are concerned, Obstfeld mentions the failure 
of the consumption-based CAPM, despite its theoretical attractions. There are 
a number of possible reasons for this. A paper by Attanasio and Weber (UCL 
87-33)  suggests that the use of aggregate rather than cohort consumption data 
may be to blame. 
5. Obstfeld discusses at some length a rational signaling effect related to the 
effects  of  the  portfolio shift  of  sterilized  intervention  on the cost to  the 
authorities of  subsequent exchange rate changes. This is ingenious stuff but 
not, I think, very convincing especially given the secrecy of most central banks 
about their operations  and the  untimeliness  and obscurity  of  most  of  their 
accounting  statements.  The  restriction  to  fully  rational  models  precludes 
another role, related to that of signaling, which is dear to the hearts of many 
central bankers. 
The failure of economists to model exchange rates, the remarkable perfor- 
mance of  the random-walk  model  (see Charles Goodhart’s 1987 inaugural 
lecture) the extent of chartist influence on traders, and the documented failure 
of traders to follow the advice even of in-house economists, together with the 
observed volatility of exchange rates, all suggest the possibility of “giving the 239  Effectiveness of Foreign-Exchange Intervention 
market  a lead.”  With  no  other rocks to cling to, might evidence that the 
authorities were prepared to ‘‘defend’  ’ a rate increase its plausibility in market 
eyes at least when the chosen rate fell within the zone of the market’s apparent 
indeterminacy? The testing of  this suggestion is made more difficult by  the 
tendency of authorities to attempt from time to time to defend the indefensible. 
6. Although I have said that I would not dissent from Obstfeld’s conclusion 
about the effectiveness of  intervention, I am less happy with his apparent 
rejection of any kind of nominal exchange rate targeting when real exchange 
rate adjustment is necessary. In an economy with a rapidly changing financial 
structure, velocity of  any monetary aggregate may become even less stable 
than PPP-type relationships. Nominal exchange rate targets or management do 
not mean fixity. Other people’s inflation rates (at least in the aggregate) are 
fairly easy to forecast. Thus a target path for the domestic price level can be 
combined with a target path for the real exchange rate and converted into a 
target path for the nominal rate. Nor do I believe that confusion on these issues 
could account for the stock market crash of last October. The incompatibility 
of prevailing rates with prevailing hopes meant something had to give-but  not 
that it had to be, or naturally could be, resolved by a crash. 
Reference 
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Comment  Hans Genberg 
Obstfeld’s paper reviews and reexamines the evidence on the effectiveness of 
official  interventions  in  the  foreign-exchange  markets  that  has  become 
available since the 1983 study of the Versailles Working Group. The rationale 
for the undertaking is that we  have observed such interventions on a much 
larger scale in the past four to five years than before. Therefore, recent data 
ought to be particularly useful for detecting any exchange rate response to 
these interventions. 
The main points of the paper can be summarized by four statements: First, 
based on a review of exchange rate behavior and macroeconomic policy since 
late 1984, the conclusion is reached that the major movements in exchange 
rates since that time can be explained by economic fundamentals. Second, an 
examination  of  the  available  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  sterilized 
interventions do not  influence exchange rate movements, at least as far as 
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channels that operate via portfolio-balance effects are concerned. Third, data 
show that interventions have been large and frequent in recent years, and that 
most of them have been sterilized. Fourth, the fact that substantial amounts of 
foreign exchange have been  used  for sterilized  intervention  in  spite  of  the 
cvidence that such interventions have no effect on the exchange rate represents 
a puzzle.  Assuming  that governments also believe that interventions  do not 
influence exchange rates, why do they engage in them? Obstfeld suggests that 
one possibility might be that interventions operate via signaling effects rather 
than through portfolio-balance channels. 
As this brief  synopsis suggests, the paper contains a nice blend of  factual 
information  (about exchange rate  movements, interventions  in the foreign- 
exchange  markets,  and  macroeconomic  policies  in  general),  theory,  and 
empirical  evidcnce. I  have  no major disagreement  with  Obstfeld  about  his 
interpretation of the facts or of the empirical evidence, nor about the theoretical 
possibility of signaling effects. In my comments I will first elaborate on the 
points raised in the paper. I then raise some doubts about the desirability of 
using intervention and exchange rate announcements as a way to signal other 
policy  changes.  I  conclude by  arguing that  we  do not  yet  seem to  have a 
satisfactory explanation of why central banks engage in sterilized interventions 
in  view  of  the  evidence  showing that  they  are  largely  ineffective  as  an 
instrument for exchange rate management. Before proceeding I would like to 
draw attention to the fact that Obstfeld tells a convincing story about exchange 
rate  movements  since  1984 based  on the  evolution  of  monetary  and fiscal 
policies.  There is no need to refer to such elusive concepts as unwinding of 
speculative bubbles, and consequently  one common argument for exchange 
rate targeting as a policy goal is undermined. 
The data presented  in  figure 5.5 of  the  paper  indicate  why  econometric 
evidence on the effectiveness of sterilized interventions is not likely to detect 
any links between exchange rate movements and relative asset stocks as in the 
portfolio-balance models. These data show that ex post yield differentials can 
be as large as  10-15  percentage  points on a quarterly basis (mainly due to 
exchange rate effects). Suppose that the portfolio-balance  model were correct 
in predicting that changes in asset stocks resulting from sterilized interventions 
do require changes in ex ante yields. Suppose further that, for the modification 
in asset stocks actually  achieved by interventions, the required  variation  in 
yields is on the order of 2-3  perccntage points on an annual basis. In this case 
one should not expect interventions to be able to account for more than between 
2  and  5 percent  of  observed ex post  yield  differentials. Other sources  of 
exchange  rate  fluctuations  are  evidently  so  large  that  they  swamp  any 
reasonable portfolio-balance effects of sterilized interventions. 
Why then do central banks engage in these types of interventions to such a 
large extent'? Obstfeld suggests one possibility, namely that the authorities use 
interventions  as  a  signal  of  future  changes in  monetary,  fiscal,  and trade 
policies that ultimately will move thc exchange rate in the desired direction. 
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market participants act on these signals. A number of questions are raised by 
this view of the role of interventions: Why, for instance, is a mere statement 
of the reorientation  of the fundamental policies not sufficient to provide the 
signal? Also, does signaling intervention provide an extra policy instrument, 
and is signaling a reliable way to influence markets? 
To deal  with  some of  these questions, Obstfeld  outlines  a theory  that  is 
basically a version of the “putting the money where your mouth is” argument. 
By buying foreign assets to prevent an appreciation of  the domestic currency, 
the central bank  creates incentives  for itself  to pursue monetary  and fiscal 
policies that are consistent with the intervention. The reason is that such policies 
would prevent capital losses on the acquired foreign assets. But creating the 
incentive to pursue a specific set of policies is presumably not enough. It is also 
necessary actually to carry out these policies. Otherwise the effect of the initial 
announcement is reversed and the credibility of  future announcements endan- 
gered. So to be effective, an announced exchange rate target must be followed 
by the required  adjustment in economic policies.  Intervening  in the foreign- 
exchange market to bolster credibility does not alter this fact. As already noted, 
such intervention ‘‘only” makes it costlier (in terms of capital losses on foreign- 
exchange holdings) for central banks to deviate from the required policies. But 
as table  5.6  in the paper illustrates,  central banks appear not  to be greatly 
influenced by such incentives since they seem to have lost substantial amounts 
of money on their intervention activities.  The quantitative  importance of  the 
incentive effects of  interventions  is thus questionable. 
What this discussion shows me is, first of all, that signals by means of  policy 
announcements and interventions in the foreign-exchange market are no substitutes 
for genuine changes in economic policies.  There are no additional degrees of 
freedom to be had this way. Furthermore, it is questionable how much additional 
mileage the authorities can get from interventions compared with straightforward 
policy announcements relating to basic macroeconomic policies. Add to this the 
danger that signals stated in terms of  desired exchange rate movements are not 
always easy to interpret and may therefore constitute a source of uncertainty in the 
economy, and we end up, in my judgement, with a rather weak case for the use 
of sterilized interventions as a tool for exchange rate management. 
If  this assessment  is correct, the question remains why there has been  so 
much sterilized intervention in the foreign-exchange markets. I can think of 
two possible reasons, neither of  which is entirely satisfactory. One is that the 
authorities  are really  concerned only  with  very  short term  exchange rate 
fluctuations,  and that  interventions do have  an  effect on these.  The main 
problem  with  this  explanation  is  that  governments  have  not  provided  a 
rationale for adopting such a short-term perspective. 
The other reason is that governments want to be seen as “doing something” 
about exchange rate misalignments  and volatility, but  they are unwilling  to 
alter underlying  policies. Interventions in the foreign-exchange market con- 
stitute a placebo for public opinion. The difficulty here, of course, is that the 
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This then leaves me with the impression that we do not yet have an entirely 
satisfactory explanation for the reasons behind central banks’ interventions in 
the foreign-exchange markets. Obstfeld’s thorough and comprehensive paper 
has provided a definitive assessment of  the effects of  interventions.  A further 
analysis of the reasons that motivate  governments to  conduct these policies 
should be next on the research agenda in this field. 
Comment  Shuntaro Namba 
We  have experienced  dramatic volatility  in foreign-exchange  markets espe- 
cially after the so-called Plaza Agreement. On the other hand, the importance 
of international policy coordination  among the major industrialized countries 
has  been  reaffirmed  and  put  into  practice.  Under  these  circumstances, 
Professor Maurice Obstfeld’s paper is a valuable attempt to evaluate the recent 
effects of foreign-exchange  intervention. 
The paper  is  well-balanced  in  its  contents,  containing  both  theoretical 
analyses  and  detailed  case studies based  upon  recent  developments in  the 
foreign-exchange  market. Also,  it  is  an  excellent  survey,  summarizing the 
theoretical and empirical  studies on the effectiveness of intervention. 
I would like to note one important point first. The effects of a certain limited 
amount of foreign-exchange intervention will depend largely on the outstand- 
ing net asset holdings of the private sector and their currency composition. For 
example, it is a well-known fact that large-scale current account imbalance has 
been persistent between the United States and Japan at present. As a result, the 
outstanding net asset holdings of the private sector have also been subject to 
change in their value and contents. In order empirically to evaluate the effects 
of intervention, we need to pay the closest attention to this aspect. 
Fundamental  Views on Intervention 
The  most  significant  finding  of  Obstfeld’s  paper-one  based  both  on 
empirical analyses and on recent experience-is  summarized in section 5.1  as 
follows: “The conclusion reached is that monetary and fiscal policies, and not 
intervention per se, have been the main policy determinants of exchange rates 
in recent years.” 
This is harmonious  with our view of intervention as a policy measure. We 
recognize  that  intervention  is  a  measure  which  can be  flexibly  adopted  to 
prevent erratic movements in the exchange rate caused by abrupt changes of 
market sentiments, without committing ourselves to set certain market levels. 
According to our knowledge of  economic theories, real foreign-exchange 
rates can be determined by the following four factors: (I) the purchasing power 
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parity  based  on relative  price  levels  among countries;  (2)  real  interest  rate 
differentials; (3) risk premiums based on accumulated current account imbal- 
ances or other related factors; and (4) market expectations. 
Monetary and fiscal policy management will influence these four factors. On 
the other hand, effects that are drawn only from sterilized intervention are not 
clear, or else are rather limited. 
Consequently, we aim at preventing excessive volatility in foreign-exchange 
markets  by  controlling  the  market  determinants,  especially  real  interest 
differentials  and  accumulated  current  account imbalances, through  interna- 
tionally coordinated  monetary and fiscal policy management. 
Effects of Intervention 
In Obstfeld’s paper, the effects of intervention are evaluated as follows: non- 
sterilized interventions are regarded as effective,  while according to  empirical 
analyses, sterilized interventions have limited effect. Obstfeld states “the portfolio 
effects of pure intervention have generally been elusive enough that intervention 
cannot be regarded as a macroeconomic policy tool in its own right”  (sec. 5.1). 
When  interventions  are  nonsterilized,  for  example  in  cases  when  the 
Japanese monetary authority buys dollars and sells yen, high-powered money 
in  the  economy will  increase, reflecting  the  rise  in  foreign  reserves;  this 
increase will then result in lower interest rates and an expanded money supply. 
Therefore, in addition to the rise in dollar demand due to interventions, lower 
interest rates and deteriorating balances of payments caused by easier monetary 
conditions will eventually cause high dollar/low yen ratios. 
The effectiveness  of  nonsterilized  intervention  is broadly  recognized  in 
academic circles, and we also support this view. However, I would like to add 
another point: we cannot be certain in advance whether or not the intervention 
is going to be sterilized.  For example, in the case of  a policy of intervention 
in  buying  the dollar,  we  determine the  volume  of  money which  should  be 
absorbed  in  the  money  market  in  consideration  of  the  overall  monetary 
situation. In other words, we cannot conduct monetary policy presupposing the 
effectiveness of  the nonsterilized  intervention. 
A  sterilized  intervention  can work effectively  through  the following two 
channels: (1) if it changes the amount of foreign-currency-denominated  bonds 
and of home-currency-denominated  bonds, and then changes risk premiums 
arising  from  foreign-exchange volatility;  and  (2) if  it  influences  market 
participants’  expectations. 
Generally, the effectiveness  of  sterilized interventions depends largely on 
the conditions of the foreign-exchange market. Two aspects of those market 
conditions are considered  below. 
Substitutability  between Domestic-Currency-  and Foreign-Currency- 
Denominated Assets 
How  many  changes  in  the  foreign-exchange rate  are  needed  to  absorb 
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market is risk neutral and the substitutability of assets between currencies is 
perfect,  then  the  risk  premium  will  be  zero.  In  that  case,  changes  in 
foreign-currency-denominated  positions  will  be  absorbed  in  the  market 
without affecting the foreign-exchange rate (therefore, the first channel for a 
sterilized intervention does not work). 
On  the  other hand,  if  the  market is risk-averse  and  the  substitutability 
between domestic and foreign currencies is not perfect, changes in  foreign- 
currency  positions  will  result  in an increase  or decrease in risk  premiums. 
These changes cannot be absorbed without changes in the foreign-exchange 
rate (so, the first channel does work). 
Market EfJiciency 
Do the foreign-exchange rates effectively reflect various sources of market 
information, such as interest rates, rates of inflation, price levels, balances of 
payments, and each government’s policy stance? 
If  the market is completely  efficient,  official interventions  cannot change 
investors’ expectations since investors  are already  well  informed  about  the 
market (therefore, the second channel does not work). 
So, intervention  will be perfectly  ineffective when (a) the substitutability 
between foreign-currency-  and home-currency-denominated  assets is perfect 
and  (b)  the  market  is  completely  efficient  at  the  same  time.  However, 
according to the various empirical analyses conducted to date, there seems to 
be some truth to the claim that the current foreign-exchange  market is in no 
such condition.  However,  it  is  not  clear  whether  this  is  because  of  the 
imperfectness  of  the  substitutability  between  assets,  or  because  of  the 
inefficiency of the market. 
In either case, we cannot determine a priori  whether these two channels 
would work. Future developments of empirical studies in this field are awaited. 
In section 5.3, Obstfeld also presents econometric analyses of the existence 
of  risk  premiums  and  discusses  whether  or  not  they  can  change.  He 
summarizes: “There is a large body of evidence contradicting the hypothesis 
that pt in equation (1) [the risk premium] is identically zero, or even constant 
over time.”(sec.  5.3.2) 
We confirmed through our econometric analyses that intervention can affect 
risk premiums and that, consequently,  sterilized interventions can have some 
effect. At the same time, however, we get the result that the effects of a certain 
limited amount of intervention are decreasing recently (see below). 
In section 5.4, Obstfeld indicates that sterilized intervention can affect the 
foreign-exchange  market through  the  so-called  ‘‘signaling effect,”  through 
which  information  on  future  policy  stances of  the  monetary  authority  is 
conveyed. 
Obstfeld also points out that sterilized intervention has the signaling effect 
since  markets can  learn  from the  monetary  authority’s  move to  avoid  the 
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rate fluctuations. This is quite an interesting point, since the idea is related to 
the ‘‘profitability criterion”  concerning the effectiveness  of intervention. 
Concerted intervention  is often regarded  as more effective than unilateral 
intervention.  One reason for this is that the monetary authorities of  involved 
countries  sometimes offer a kind  of collateral  as a pledge of exchange rate 
stability.  Therefore, the  signaling  effects of  concerted intervention  have  a 
higher credibility to the market than those of unilateral intervention. 
Also, the foreign-exchange market  is  counted as  the  most  efficient  one 
among all financial markets as it fairly quickly reacts to all information on the 
policy  stances  of  various  governments  and  monetary  authorities.  So,  in 
addition to the signaling effect that Obstfeld pointed out, I would like to add 
that an unanticipated intervention also plays an important role in conveying a 
signaling effect in a fairly efficient market. 
Our Recent Econometric Result 
Recently, Mitsuhiro Fukao, a member of the staff of our institute, estimated 
an  equation  of  real  foreign-exchange rates  explained  by  real  interest  rate 
differentials between the United  States and Japan and risk premium factors. 
The regression was conducted through the period from the first quarter of  1973 
to the end of  1987. 
where  e, is  the  real  exchange  rate  of  yen  against  the  dollar (dollariyen, 
indexed); rJ  and I-“  are the long-term real interest rates for Japan and the United 
States, respectively; M”  is the variance for rates of change in yen-dollar real 
exchange rates as compared to the previous term (unchanged throughout the 
observed period); MJg  is the covariance between rates of  change in yen-dollar 
real exchange rates and those in mark-dollar real exchange rates as compared 
to the previous term (unchanged throughout the observed period); BJ and Bg 
are accumulated current account imbalances for Japan and for the total of all 
EMS participant  countries, respectively (standardized by the total of  nominal 
GNP for major countries); (Y is a constant; p, is the coefficient for real interest 
rates; and y,  is the coefficient for accumulated current account imbalances. 
This equation  is basically  the same as  Obstfeld’s equation (1).  Here, y, 
(MJJBI + MJgBf’) is the risk  premium. For this regression,  Fukao used the 
Kalman filter  which  allows the  coefficients  p,  and  yt to vary  during the 
observed period. 
The result of the estimation is as follows: while real interest rate coefficient 
(p,)  increased  largely,  risk  premium  coefficient  (yr)  has decreased but  not 
reached zero in this regression  period. 
This reflects the financial globalization in which real interest rate differen- 
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effects of  the  change of  the  risk  premium  explained by  the change in  the 
external net asset are seen to have decreased. 
From this empirical result, we can get the following implications concerning 
the effectiveness of sterilized intervention: risk premium factors are apparent 
(y,#O);  therefore, sterilized intervention can be effective to some degree. But 
the effects of sterilized intervention recently have been weakened. 
According  to our estimation, if  an  additional $10 billion of  sterilized in- 
tervention had been conducted, it would have changed the yen rate from the 
actual level by  7.7 percent in the fourth quarter of  1974 and by  1.7 percent 
in the last quarter of  1987. 